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Elite lawyers have long urged the private practice bar to account for the in-
terests of more than their clients in their work. A lawyer who served merely as a
"mouthpiece" or "hired gun" of clients failed to meet the standards of profession-
alism, of failing to act, in Roscoe Pound's words, "in the spirit of a public ser-
vice." Pound's view, expressed in the mid-20th century, was premised on the
ideal that the lawyer pursued a public calling that incidentally was remunerative.
This ideal required the lawyer to serve as a social trustee, one encumbered by du-
ties for the benefit of society. Pound's statement was embraced by the American
Bar Association and elite lawyers as exemplifying professionalism. The lawyer as
social trustee professional reached its apex in the mid-1970s. Within a decade,
lawyers wrote lamenting the end of the profession of law, of its descent into a
trade or business. This lament has continued for thirty years.
This essay discusses the reasons for the fall of social trustee professionalism
and why lawyers should not expect its return. It suggests some parallels with a
crisis of professionalism that occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century, and why that crisis provides some insights into the legal profession's
present dilemma.
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I. Introduction
At its annual meeting in August 1983, the American Bar Association (ABA)
prominently featured (receiving "Presidential Showcase" status) a program of the
Section on Tort and Insurance Practice (TIPS) titled The Lawyer's Professional In-
dependence.' One of the speakers, Peter Megargee Brown,2 called his talk The De-
cline of Lawyers' Professional Independence.3 Brown asked, among other ques-
tions, "Is the law becoming a profession whose members are no longer obligated
as officers of the court to serve both private clients and the public interest?"4
His answer, as reflected in his title, was "cumulative evidence indicates a serious
decline in the American lawyer's professionalism and independence in the last ten
years."5 Brown argued that one of the causes of this decline was "the promulgation
of the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct,"6 which the ABA formally
adopted at this same meeting.' That the Model Rules might be a cause of profes-
sional decline was the antithesis of the goal of the Kutak Commission that drafted
the rules,8 and possibly evidence that Brown's claim was accurate.
Brown's talk, and the TIPS program as a whole, hit a professional nerve:
Brown's views were republished in several bar journals,9 and the ABA published
all of the talks as a stand-alone book. ABA President Morris Harrell drew the pro-
fession's attention to maintaining professionalism by making it the subject of his
President's Page column in the July 1983 issue of the ABA Journal.'o
The positive reaction to this negative view led to a second program concern-
ing the decline of professionalism, again organized by TIPS, for the 1984 ABA
Annual Meeting. This program too was given Presidential Showcase status, and
1. See THE LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE: PRESENT THREATS/FUTURE CHALLENGES
(John B. Davidson ed., 1984) (reprinting talks) (hereinafter PRESENT THREATS).
2. Brown's interesting memoir provides some background of his family, though not of his
law practice. See PETER MEGARGEE BROWN, FLIGHTS OF MEMORY, DAYS BEFORE YESTERDAY: A MEMOIR
(1989).
3. Peter Megargee Brown, The Decline of Lawyers' Professional Independence, in PRESENT
THREATS, supra note 1, at 23.
4. Id. at 23-24.
5. Id. at 25.
6. Id. at 34.
7. See Proceedings of the 1983 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 108 A.B.A. REP.
763, 778 (1983).
8. See Michael Ariens, The Last Hurrah: The Kutak Commission and the End of Optimism,
49 CREIGHTON L. REV. 689 (2016).
9. See Peter Megargee Brown, The Decline of Lawyers' Professional Independence, 55 N.Y.
ST. B.J. 11 (1983); Peter Megargee Brown, The Decline of Lawyers' Professional Independence, 55
CLEVE. B. Ass'N J. 306 (1984); Peter Megargee Brown, The Decline of Lawyers' Professional Inde-
pendence, 2 DEL. LAW. 7 (1984); Peter Megargee Brown, Decline of Lawyers' Professional Indepen-
dence, 31 N.C. ST. B. Q. 19 (1984). See also Peter Megargee Brown, Misguided Lawyers, 47 TEX. B.J.
319 (1984) (printing edited version of talk).
10. Morris Harrell, Preserving Professionalism, 69 ABA J. 864 (1983).
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the talks were again published by the ABA as a stand-alone book." Between the
two showcases, Chief Justice Warren Burger gave a talk at the ABA's February
1984 Midyear meeting decrying the decline in lawyer professionalism.'2 At the
1984 Annual Meeting, the ABA created a Special Commission on Professional-
ism in response to the possibility that "the Bar might be moving away from the
principles of professionalism and that it was so perceived by the public."' 3 In
1986, the Special Commission issued its Stanley Report, ". . . In the Spirit of Pub-
lic Service:" A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism,"14 the
title of which indicated its views on the standing of professionalism in the Amer-
ican legal profession. TIPS followed up its earlier work with a Report to the ABA
urging state and local bar associations to adopt a lawyers' creed of professional-
ism.' 5 The ABA's House of Delegates enthusiastically adopted both the Stanley
Report and the TIPS Report,16 and a torrent of conferences, articles and books
focused on this transformation of the obligations of the American lawyer.
Despite, or possibly because of, such efforts, the diagnosis of professional de-
cline has remained a dominant theme among lawyers for three decades. Well
over 100 bar associations and courts have adopted a professionalism creed since
the ABA urged them to do so." Additionally, several states have made their law-
yers subject to discipline if they repeatedly and substantially fail to meet the re-
quirements of the state-mandated creed.' But the fear of a fall continues to
11. THE LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE: AN IDEAL REVISITED (John B. Davidson ed.,
1985) (hereinafter AN IDEAL REVISITED). See also TIPS Notes, 14 BRIEF 2 (1984-85) (reporting
speech by Roger Cramton discussing two models of professional behavior, the "public interest"
model and the market model).
12. Warren E. Burger, The State of Justice, ABA J., Apr. 1984, at 62.
13. Report of the Commission on Professionalism, 111 A.B.A. REP. No. 2, at 369, 373 (1986).
14. ABA Comm'n on Professionalism, '. . . IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:' A BLUEPRINT FOR
THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1986). The Report was also printed as ABA Comm'n
on Professionalism, '. . . In the Spirit of Public Service:' A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer
Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243 (1987).
15. Report No. 2 of the Section of Tort and Insurance Practice, 113 A.B.A. REP. No. 2, at 589
(1988).
16. Proceedings of the 1988 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 113 A.B.A. REP.
No. 2, at 4, 25 (1988).
17. My research assistant Sumner Macdaniel has compiled a list of 123 civility and/or pro-
fessionalism codes and creeds by bar associations and courts (copy on file with author). Somewhat
relatedly, a June 24, 2016 Westlaw search of the phrase "In the Spirit of Public Service" since 1986
in the Secondary Sources file lists 709 references. See also Cheryl B. Preston & Hilary Lawrence,
Incentivizing Lawyers to Play Nice: A National Survey of Civility Standards and Options for En-
forcement, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 701 (2015) (surveying 40 states, including District of Colum-
bia, that have adopted professionalism creeds).
18. See In re Code for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, 116 So. 3d 280 (Fla. 2013);
Ariz. Sup. Ct. R. 31 (West 2014). See also In re Anonymous Member of the South Carolina
Bar, 709 S.E.2d 633 (S.C. 2011) (holding constitutional civility provision in attorney oath); Matter
of White, 707 S.E.2d 411 (S.C. 2011) (holding ninety day suspension from practice appropriate due
in part to White's "blatant incivility and lack of decorum").
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resonate.19 Individual lawyers regularly bear the burden of serving the public inter-
est by representing unpopular (on left and right) clients and causes, and these ef-
forts may gain some positive recognition. The civility movement's effort to
focus on the rewards for positive lawyer behavior also are valuable, though such
efforts operate in very narrow channels. Civility is a virtue the profession should
inculcate in lawyers, but should not be equated with professionalism.20 In sum,
the larger legal profession remains enmeshed in a professionalism crisis, a crisis
found in the fall of social trustee professionalism.
This is a story of social trustee21 professionalism in the American legal pro-
fession. More particularly, it examines the reasons for the decline of social trustee
professionalism beginning in the middle of the 1970s.2 2 Social trustee profession-
alism in the legal profession required lawyers to use their expert knowledge to
serve society.23 The tension in the private practice profession was in balancing
the need (or desire) for income by representing clients with a duty to serve the
public. Among lawyers, professionalism was ordinarily defined in contrast with
commercialism. ABA President Harrell's July 1983 column noted that, though
no universally-accepted definition existed, professionalism "involves acceptance
of high ethical standards, which generally include a dedication to public services
for the benefit and protection of society that looks beyond the mere earning of a
livelihood." 24 A professional was required "to serve both private clients and the
public interest."25 This public interest model differed from a market model, in
which the lawyer was engaged in a business in which "success is measured solely
by profits,"26 and the lawyer was free from any duty to any discernable public
interest. More particularly, the lawyer's duty to the public was premised on the
lawyer's importance in serving as a mediating body between client and state in
the American democratic experiment. This particular public duty required the
lawyer to consider how best to generate and maintain a just society. The duty
19. In Westlaw file Secondary Sources limited to the past three years, the phrase "in the spirit
of public service" is referenced sixty times.
20. See Roger Cramton, On Giving Meaning to "Professionalism," in TEACHING AND LEARN-
ING PROFESSIONALISM 7, 14-15 (1997) (noting "[w]hen the profession talks as if civility is the heart of
professionalism, it abandons a commitment to the vital task: defining lawyer roles and attitudes that
will result in a just social order").
21. See generally STEVEN BRINT, IN AN AGE OF EXPERTS: THE CHANGING ROLE OF PROFESSIONALS
IN POLITICS AND PUBLIC LIFE 36 (1994) (noting rise and fall of social trustee professionalism in law
and elsewhere).
22. Brint suggests the decline begins slightly earlier than I do. See id. at 10.
23. As stated by Brint, "[T]he dominant form of professionalism ... combined civic-minded
moral appeals and circumscribed technical appeals: a commitment to the public welfare and high
ethical standards combined with a claim to specialized authority over a limited sphere of formal
knowledge." Id. at 36.
24. Harrell, supra note 10, at 864. This predates Brint but follows closely his definition of
social trustee professionalism.
25. Brown, supra note 3, at 24.
26. Id.
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to client and duty to the public were often, indeed usually, congruent. Even so, a
tension existed between the two that required the lawyer to use her conscience in
resolving or lessening such tension.
My thesis is that the legal profession has repeatedly claimed professionalism
is in decline. This most recent claim of professional decline occurred in the 1970s
and early 1980s. That decline was not different in kind from earlier profession-
alism crises: what differentiates this professionalism crisis from earlier crises is
that it appears to have no end, due largely to the fall in social trustee profession-
alism, including the decline in serving as a mediating institution between individ-
ual and state.
The profession's inability to move past this anxious stage is linked to several
ideological and instrumental events. One ideological reason is the effect of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The Rules gave lawyers the opportunity
to offload considerations of ethics from one's conscience to an outside authority.
A second ideological reason is an unintended consequence of a greater emphasis
on ending any aristocracy among American lawyers. The demise of the elite law-
yer as aristocrat and of noblesse oblige was concomitant with the rise of market-
based technocratic expertise, including in law. One instrumental reason for this
professionalism crisis was the change in the structure of the large law firm, itself
a result of the uninterrupted increase in the percentage of legal services given to
corporate legal needs. A second reason was the continued sorting of lawyers,
which created a distancing effect impairing the values of a unified bar.27
Section II discusses lawyers' understanding of the meaning of professional-
ism from mid-century America to 1970. Section III assesses the professionalism
crisis that began in the mid-1970s, and then looks at an earlier crisis of profes-
sionalism, one that occurred from the 1890s through the 1920s. It then examines
how and why the language of professionalism moved from hope to despair. Sec-
tion IV offers a brief conclusion.
II. The Professional Lawyer, 1940-1970
In 1944, former Harvard Law School Dean Roscoe Pound published a series
of essays on the history of the legal profession.28 He began by defining a profes-
sion: "Historically, there are three ideas involved in a profession, organization,
learning, and a spirit of public service. These are essential. The remaining
idea,that of gaining a livelihood, is incidental."29
27. See generally Michael Ariens, Sorting: Specialization and the Privatization of the Amer-
ican Legal Profession, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 579 (2016).
28. See Roscoe Pound, What Is a Profession? The Rise of the Legal Profession in Antiquity,
19 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 203 (1944); Roscoe Pound, The Legal Profession in the Middle Ages, 19
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 229 (1944); Roscoe Pound, The Legal Profession in England from the End of
the Middle Ages to the Nineteenth Century, 19 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 315 (1944); Roscoe Pound, The
Legal Profession in America, 19 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 334 (1944).
29. Pound, What Is a Profession?, supra note 28, at 204.
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Shortly after the end of World War II, the ABA initiated a Survey of the
Legal Profession, intended to evaluate "the functioning of lawyers in a free so-
ciety."30 Among the many studies supported by the Survey was a book about
the history of the legal profession (and bar associations) written by Pound. Titled
The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times, it was published in 1953. Pound
slightly re-phrased his earlier definition of a profession: It consisted of a
".group . . . pursuing a learned art . . . in the spirit of a public service-no less
a public service because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood." 31
A. The Legal Profession and Anti-Communism
Pound's history of lawyers was published at the height of the Second Red
Scare, a fraught time in the long Cold War between the United States and the
Soviet Union.32 In 1953, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
whose chairman was Senator Joseph McCarthy, held regular hearings regarding
claims of infiltration of American government and society by Communists.
What helped bring about McCarthy's hearings in 1953 and 1954 were earlier
instances in which Americans had sworn fealty to the Soviet Union. An early and
extraordinarily prominent example was the Alger Hiss investigation by the House
Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) during the last half of 1948.
Whittaker Chambers alleged before HUAC that Hiss, a Harvard Law School
graduate who had worked in the State Department during World War II, was a
Communist spy.33 Hiss testified under oath before HUAC two days later, and de-
nied Chambers's allegations.34 Hiss was charged with perjury, and at his second
trial ending in early 1950, was convicted.35 Between those two dates, the Soviet
Union exploded an atomic bomb, made possible in part by the disclosure of
atomic secrets by others, including Americans.36
30. See Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 71 A.B.A. REP. 310, 310 (1946). The Survey
was initially approved by the House of Delegates in 1944 and limited to a survey of legal education
and admissions to the bar. See Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 69 A.B.A. REP. 456 (1944).
The Survey was funded in part by the ABA, but the Council of the Survey maintained its indepen-
dence from the ABA. See Reginald Heber Smith, Survey of the Legal Profession: Its Scope, Meth-
ods and Objectives, 39 ABA J. 548, 548 (1953).
31. Roscoe Pound, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953).
32. Much has been written regarding the Cold War, especially the period from the end of
World War II to the mid-1950s. See, e.g., STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE AMERICAN INQUISITION: JUSTICE
AND INJUSTICE IN THE COLD WAR (1982). See also GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES 323-426
(2004) (discussing issues of freedom of speech during Second Red Scare).
33. ALLEN WEINSTEIN, PERJURY: THE Hiss-CHAMBERS CASE 5 (updated ed. 1997) (1978) (noting
that Chambers had qualified his allegation: "The purpose of this group at that time was not primar-
ily espionage. Its original purpose was the Communist infiltration of the American Government.
But espionage was certainly one of its eventual objectives.").
34. Id. at 10.
35. Id. at 419-46 (discussing second trial and conviction of Hiss).
36. See RONALD RADOSH & JOYCE MILTON, THE ROSENBERG FILE 451 (2d ed. 1997) (noting that
while the "Rosenberg spy ring was surprisingly productive, given its origins, it was never the pri-
mary conduit of U.S. atomic secrets to the Soviets").
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A year before the Hiss investigation, in March 1947, President Harry Tru-
man published Executive Order 9835, creating a "loyalty program" applicable
to all civilian employees in the executive branch.37 The loyalty program assessed
whether persons employed in the executive branch supported the Constitution
and opposed Communism, in significant part by requiring them to swear an
oath of loyalty to the United States government and to deny past or present mem-
bership in the Communist Party.
In 1950, as Senator Joseph McCarthy began alleging unnamed persons work-
ing in the State Department were Communists, the ABA Assembly adopted two
Resolutions, one directly, and the other indirectly related to the loyalty oath and
lawyer professionalism. The indirect Resolution opposed governmental legal aid
because such would make the legal profession "dependent upon government hand-
outs or subsidies." The Assembly resolved, "That it is the primary responsibility of
the legal profession, as part of its high tradition of service to the public,... and in
order to forestall the threat to individual freedom implicit in growing efforts to so-
cialize the legal profession," to support privately-operated legal aid.38
The direct Resolution was an effort to extend to all lawyers the duty to swear
loyalty to the United States. Five Texas lawyers, including future ABA President
Robert G. Storey,39 submitted their proposal to the Committee on Resolutions.
Because the "lawyers of America" possessed a "much greater duty than citizens
generally to support the principles of the Constitution and oppose the doctrines of
Communism inconsistent therewith," "it is especially appropriate that all licensed
to practice law in the United States of American be required" to "attest to his loy-
alty to our form of government by anti-Communist oath."40
Though the ABA loyalty oath resolution was adopted without any recorded
dissent, opposition to it was voiced shortly thereafter by elite lawyers, including
37. Exec. Order 9835 (March 21, 1947).
38. Proceedings of the Assembly, 75 A.B.A. REP. 87, 93-94 (1950).
39. On Storey, see The New President of the Association: Robert Gerald Storey, 38 ABA J.
831 (1952).
40. Sessions of the Assembly, 75 A.B.A. REP. 87, 94 (1950). It is not a coincidence that this
Resolution was made less than a year after the end of United States v. Dennis, the trial of twelve
persons who served on the national board of the Communist Party of the United States. Dennis was
then "the longest criminal trial in American legal history." STONE, supra note 32, at 396. Immedi-
ately after the trial verdict in Dennis was read, trial judge Harold Medina began contempt proceed-
ings against the attorneys for the now-convicted defendants. See KUTLER, supra note 32, at 157. The
lawyers' contempt citations were upheld on appeal, United States v. Sacher, 182 F. 416 (2d Cir.
1950), and Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952), and the lawyers were the subject of lengthy
and significant bar disciplinary proceedings as well. See KUTLER, supra note 32, at 164-80. The
ABA's 1950 Annual Meeting was held in Washington, D.C., from September 18-22, at the same
time the House and Senate debated and approved the McCarran Act. See 64 Stat. 987. The Act cre-
ated a Subversive Activities Control Board to investigate those allegedly supporting totalitarian re-
gimes and required Communist organizations to register with the Attorney General. It became law
upon an override of President Truman's veto.
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Harvard Law School Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,4 1 Whitney North Sey-
mour,42 Harrison Tweed,4 3 former Supreme Court Associate Justice Owen J.
Roberts44 and over twenty other prominent lawyers.45 The Association of the
Bar of the City of New York (ABCNY), of which Seymour was then President,
narrowly voted to oppose the "loyalty oath for lawyers" in December 1950.46 So,
too, did the Massachusetts Bar Association.47
Both ABA resolutions were premised on social trustee professionalism. One
justification for opposing government funding of legal aid was, "Equal justice for
all implies the availability of the services of lawyers to all citizens regardless of
their financial means."4 8 Further, opposition to government-supported legal aid
was important because the "legal profession must be free and independent if it
is to serve both its clients and society to the full." 49 The legal profession served
the public by serving those persons unable to pay. It also did so by acting as a
mediating body between the citizen and the state. These commonplace connec-
tions were offered because the legal profession perceived itself as an essential as-
pect of the American democratic experiment.5 0 The loyalty oath Resolution en-
joyed a similar genesis. Lawyers possessed the duty to protect the liberty of
the American people by acting as the primary defenders of the Constitution be-
cause of their expertise and their duty "to serve courts of justice."5'
The quest by some to demonstrate fervent patriotism left unanswered the in-
strumental question, How will this oath actually accomplish its goal? All lawyers
swore an oath to defend the Constitution when admitted to the bar, and given the
secretiveness of many of those supportive of the Soviet Union or Communism
more generally, the loyalty oath appeared unlikely to smoke out any lawyer-
41. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA
239 (1976). Chafee was the author of FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES, first published in 1921,
which offered a broad defense of the right to speak, and which nearly led to his censure by a special
committee at Harvard. On Chafee, see Rodney A. Smolla, Chafee, Zechariah, Jr., in YALE BIOGRAPHI-
CAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 100 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009) (hereinafter YALE DICTIONARY).
42. On Seymour, see Conrad K. Harper, Seymour, Whitney North, in YALE DICTIONARY at 490;
A VISIT WITH WHITNEY NORTH SEYMOUR (Eleanor M. Fox comp. & ed., 1984).
43. On Tweed, see Robert MacCrate, Tweed, Harrison, in YALE DICTIONARY at 555.
44. On Roberts, see Richard D. Friedman, Roberts, Owen Josephus, in YALE DICTIONARY at
461. See The Proposed Anti-Communist Oath, Opposition Expressed to Association's Policy, 37
ABA J. 123, 124 (1951) (listing signatories).
45. See Association Activities, 6 THE RECORD 3, 4-5 (1951) (re-printing letter and signatories
opposing loyalty oath).
46. See id. at 3.
47. Id.
48. Sessions of the Assembly, 75 A.B.A. REP. 87, 93 (1950).
49. Id.
50. For a rumination, see PAUL D. CARRINGTON, STEWARDS OF DEMOCRACY: LAW AS A PUBLIC
PROFESSION (1999).
51. Sessions of the Assembly, supra note 48, at 94.
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Communists.52 Its breadth seemed more likely to smear the reputations (and thus,
economic prospects) of some lawyers, for included without explanation was the
decision to frame the oath to require disclosure of past membership in the Com-
munist Party or having been "affiliated therewith." Even so, the language of the
loyalty oath remained encased in the language of public service. The ABA As-
sembly understood the "high tradition of service to the public" was essential to
"forestall the threat to individual liberty" in both resolutions.
A core professional concern related to the loyalty oath was the legal repre-
sentation of those charged with "political crimes," and those under investigation
by a federal or state loyalty board, HUAC, or later, McCarthy.5 3 In 1948, shortly
before HUAC investigated Alger Hiss, federal judge Charles Wyzanski54 gave a
talk to the members of the ABCNY suggesting the creation and adoption of pro-
cedural rules protecting the rights of those subpoenaed by congressional investi-
gating committees.5 5 One procedural rule proposed by Wyzanski was the "right
to have counsel present."56 But would lawyers agree to represent those accused of
ties to Communism?
It soon became clear that too few lawyers were willing to represent alleged
Communists. In November 1951, Washington Post publisher Philip Graham,
trained as a lawyer, gave a speech to the ABCNY. He discussed the importance
of lawyers in protecting the liberty of Americans when many were recklessly and
harmfully accused of being Communists, or of being affiliated with Communism.
Graham pessimistically concluded, "[T]he legal profession has substantially
failed to meet its proper obligations of supporting individual freedom."5 7 Graham
suggested the tepid response of the bar in defending alleged Communists, unlike
its fervent response during the First Red Scare after World War I, might be a re-
sult of "the subservience of many lawyers to their client's points of view, of the
growing tendency to consider a lawyer a part of his client rather than a part of the
law, and in general of the growing commercialization of the profession."5 8 This
trend, he concluded, might leave the legal profession in the position that it "can
52. See Association Activities, supra note 45, at 4-5 (reprinting statement of 25 bar leaders
opposed to loyalty oath for lawyers, which notes that he "true communist" will "swear falsely,
even at the risk of disbarment for perjury").
53. KUTLER, supra note 32, at 152-182, focuses on the contempt and disbarment proceedings
made against the lawyers in United States v. Dennis. See also AUERBACH, supra note 41, at 231-62.
54. On Wyzanski, see Mark I. Gelfand, Wyzanski, Charles E., in YALE DICTIONARY at 606.
55. Charles E. Wyzanski, Standards for Congressional Investigations, 3 THE RECORD 93
(1948). A Code of Investigative Procedures was adopted by the ABA House of Delegates upon rec-
ommendation of the Special Committee on Individual Rights as Affected by National Security in
1954. See Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 79 A.B.A. REP. 115, 123-32 (1954).
56. Wyzanski, supra note 55, at 106.
57. Philip L. Graham, A Publisher Looks at the Law, 7 THE RECORD 14, 20 (1952).
58. Id. at 27-28.
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no longer pretend to be guided by a sense of public responsibility higher than the
ordinary self-interest of the business men and merchants."59
Graham's excoriation of the legal profession was, like the ABA's 1950 res-
olutions, framed in terms of the lawyer's duty to meet the standards of social
trustee professionalism. The most honorable lawyer bound himself to "a sense
of public responsibility," but those lawyers were too few in supply. Graham's in-
dictment was largely accurate.60 Although some lawyers, notably the name part-
ners in Arnold, Fortas and Porter, represented those accused of some type of sub-
version or disloyalty, many were silent, often for fear of economic ruin.61 As
early as 1946, Attorney General Tom Clark emphasized that the revolutionary
lawyer who "uses every device in the legal category to further the interests of
those who would destroy our government by force, if necessary," should be
taken "to the legal woodshed for a definite and well-deserved admonition."62
In mid-1949, shortly after he was confirmed to the Court and during the trial
of leaders of the Communist Party of the United States, Clark wrote that lawyers
"who act like Communists and carry out Communist missions in offensives
against the dignity and order of our courts" may not be fit to practice law.63
John P. Frank concluded in a 1952 law review article, "It is now, as I can person-
ally vouch from some observation, almost impossible to obtain 'respectable coun-
sel' in the political cases."6 4 This was because "many lawyers believe they will
be professionally ruined if they take such cases."65
Shortly after Graham spoke to the members of the ABCNY, the ABA House
of Delegates created a Special Committee on Individual Rights as Affected by
National Security.6 6 It appeared to act as a counterweight to the ABA's Special
Committee on Communist Tactics, Strategy and Objectives, created by the ABA
59. Id. at 28.
60. See, e.g., GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS: THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE Asso-
CIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 1870-1970, at 277 (1970) (concluding "In a sense
Graham's indictment of the legal profession was fair.").
61. See LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 127-51 (1990) (concluding "whatever
their reward for fighting McCarthyism, their position required courage.").
62. See Tom C. Clark, Civil Rights: The Boundless Responsibility of Lawyers, 36 ABA J.
453, 457 (1946). See also ALEXANDER WOHL, FATHER, SON, AND CONSTITUTION: How JUSTICE TOM
CLARK AND ATTORNEY GENERAL RAMSEY CLARK SHAPED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 123 (2013).
63. See KUTLER, supra note 32, at 154 (quoting August 30, 1949 Look magazine article writ-
ten by Clark). See also WOHL, supra note 62, at 124. Clark was officially sworn in as an associate
justice on August 24, 1949.
64. John P. Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1950-51, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 165, 199
(1952).
65. Id. at 200.
66. Report of the Board of Governors, 77 A.B.A. REP. 463 (1952) (requesting House of Del-
egates approve creation of Special Committee, which it did in unreported proceeding). The creation
of the Special Committee may have been a result of Graham's talk, in which he suggested, "Espe-
cially needed in these times of fear has been the creation of some respected body to examine how
we can achieve a better balance of individual freedom and national security." Graham, supra
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in 1950.67 Whitney North Seymour, a partner in the Wall Street firm of Simpson
Thacher and Bartlett who had led the effort in the ABCNY to oppose the loyalty
oath, was named its Chairman. The Special Committee was instructed "to make
such recommendations to the Association ... to bring about the best possible bal-
ance between the demands of national security and the exercise of the freedom of
the individual citizen."68
Eighteen months later, the House of Delegates adopted the resolutions proposed
by the Special Committee.69 The Special Committee's Second Resolution was
That the American Bar Association reaffirms the principles that the
right of defendants to the benefit of assistance of counsel and the
duty of the bar to provide such aid even to the most unpopular defen-
dants involves public acceptance of the correlative right of a lawyer
to represent and defend, in accordance with the standards of the legal
profession, any client without being penalized by having imputed to
him his client's reputation, views or character.70
The Second Resolution consisted of three additional subparts, which com-
mitted the ABA to support lawyers "against criticism or attack in connection
with such representation," to "continue to educate the profession and the public"
on the rights and duties to represent even the most unpopular client, and to urge
state and local bar associations to implement "these declarations of principles."7 '
Although unstated, these principles were enshrined in the ABA's 1908 Ca-
nons of Ethics. Canon 15, titled How Far a Lawyer May Go in Supporting a Cli-
ent's Cause, demanded that the lawyer, in the discharge of his duty to his client,
act without fear or favor: "No fear of judicial disfavor or public unpopularity
should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty." 72 This public responsi-
bility was also emphasized in Canon 5, discussing The Defense or Prosecution of
Those Accused of Crime. The criminal defense lawyer possessed a "right" to de-
fend any accused person, "regardless of [the lawyer's] personal opinion as to the
note 57, at 27. As Graham noted, President Harry S. Truman asked the ABA to "turn its attention to
the same matters." Id.
67. See 75 A.B.A. Rep. 46 (1950) (listing members of Special Committee to Study Commu-
nist Tactics, Strategy and Objectives). That Committee issue its first Report at the February 1951
ABA Midyear Meeting, successfully proposing that the ABA expel from membership any person
"who is a member of the Communist Part of the United States or who advocates Marxism-
Leninism." Report of the Special Committee to Study Communist Tactics, Strategy and Objectives,
76 A.B.A. REP. 586, 586 (1951).
68. See Report, supra note 66, at 463.
69. See Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 78 A.B.A. Rep. 118, 132-33 (1953). See also
Report of the Special Committee on Individual Rights as Affected by National Security, 78 A.B.A.
REP. 304 (1953).
70. Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 78 A.B.A. Rep. at 133 (stating Resolution 11.(1)).
71. Id. (quoting Resolutions 11.(2), 11.(3), and 11.(4)) (emphases in original).
72. Canon 15, ABA CANONS OF ETHICS (1908).
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guilt of the accused." And once the lawyer took the case, "the lawyer is bound, by
all fair and honorable means, to present every defense that the law of the land
permits."7 3 This ideal had been found wanting in actual events.
One difficulty faced by Seymour's Committee was the work of the ABA's
Special Committee on Communist Tactics. This Committee urged in its two
1953 Reports to the House of Delegates that lawyers who refused to testify by
invoking their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination be investi-
gated concerning their fitness to practice law.74 The next year Communist Tactics
took another step, concluding that "any member of the bar who avails himself of
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution to refuse to give testimony ... as to
possible communist affiliation or other subversive activities, thereby automati-
cally disqualifies himself from the practice of the profession."7 5
In early 1954, Newsweek magazine published an interview with Senator Joe
McCarthy, chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.76 Most
of the interview concerned McCarthy's responses to strong criticism of his tactics
and allegations by lawyer Telford Taylor." One of Taylor's criticisms was that
McCarthy's attacks on the Army's Signal Corps laboratories were a "fiasco."
Taylor was a former prosecutor at the Nuremberg War Trials, a lawyer in private
practice in New York City, and a Reserve Brigadier General. McCarthy made
vague but unsubtle claims that Taylor's criticism of McCarthy was best explained
by Taylor's legal work "defending Communists."8
Defending Taylor, Bethuel M. Webster, President of the ABCNY, wrote a
letter to the Newsweek editor. Webster gave a spirited defense of Taylor's ac-
tions. Taylor was defending "unpopular clients or in unpopular causes,"7 9 as law-
yers were duty-bound to do. Webster's letter cited the ABCNY's January 1953
resolution defending the right of a lawyer to defend an unpopular client without
"having imputed to him his client's reputation, views or character."8 0
73. Canon 5, ABA CANONS OF ETHICS (1908).
74. Report of the Special Committee on Communist Tactics, Strategy and Objectives, 78
A.B.A. REP. 439 (1953); Report of the Special Committee on Communist Tactics, Strategy and Ob-
jectives, 78 A.B.A. REP. 291 (1953).
75. Report of the Special Committee on Communist Tactics, Strategy and Objectives, 79
A.B.A. REP. 318, 319 (1954).
76. 'I am Happy to Plead Guilty', NEWSWEEK, Jan. 25, 1954, at 30.
77. On Taylor, see Jonathan A. Bush, Taylor, Telford, in YALE DICTIONARY at 540.
78. Taylor represented the labor leader and accused Communist Harry Bridges in the govern-
ment's denaturalization proceedings, not in Bridges' criminal cases. That was irrelevant to McCar-
thy. See 'lam Happy', supra note 76, at 30. On the cases involving Bridges, see KUTLER, supra note
32, at 118-51.
79. Letters, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 1, 1954, at 2-3.
80. See Association Activities, 8 THE RECORD 57 (1953) (quoting adopted Resolution). Letters,
at 3.
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The ABCNY resolution helped lay the groundwork for a similar resolution
adopted by the ABA in August 1953. So, too, did the fact that the New York State
Bar Association followed the same path taken by the ABCNY.s'
Despite institutional support for those representing unpopular clients, the
problem of finding counsel for unpopular causes and clients persisted. In its
1953 Report, the ABA Special Committee on Individual Rights as Affected by
National Security noted that "counsel of outstanding reputations, well known
for their anti-Communist views, in several recent cases involving Communists,
or persons accused of being Communists, which they took out of sense of public
duty, have been subjected to severe personal vilification and abuse."82 Irving R.
Kaufman, who presided in the 1951 criminal trial of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg
for atomic espionage,83 gave a talk to the Buffalo Lawyers' Club in November
1953 decrying the threat to the right to counsel. Published in the ABA Journal,
Kaufman concluded that the "increasing reluctance of attorneys to defend"
those accused of "crimes related to Communism" was "a serious threat to the in-
tegrity of our system of criminal justice."84
By the end of 1954, Joe McCarthy had been censured by the Senate. The
Second Red Scare was coming to an end, though its reverberations continued
within the legal profession for much of the next decade. State bar admissions
committees and state courts possessing the power to admit applicants to the
bar continued to use the threat of Communism to deny applications to practice
law.85 For example, George Anastaplo was denied admission to the Illinois bar
by the Committee for Character and Fitness for refusing to state whether he be-
lieved in God or had ever been a Communist, as well as for paraphrasing Thomas
Jefferson's statement in the Declaration of Independence concerning the right of
the people to abolish their government.86 The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the
Committee's decision in 1954, and the Supreme Court denied Anastaplo's peti-
tion for certiorari.
81. See Association Activities, supra note 80, at 57.
82. Report of the Special Committee on Individual Rights as Affected by National Security, 78
A.B.A. REP. 304, 307 (1953).
83. See The Rosenberg Trial, available at http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/
rosenb/ROSENB.HTM (last visited June 28, 2016). On Kaufman, see Jay C. Carlisle, Kaufman, Ir-
ving R., in YALE DICTIONARY at 308.
84. Irving R. Kaufman, Representation by Counsel: A Threatened Right, 40 ABA J. 299, 299
(1954).
85. See generally AUERBACH, supra note 41, at 249-53.
86. In re Anastaplo, 121 N.E.2d 826 (Ill. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 946 (1955). Anasta-
plo's renewed request for bar admission after Schware and Konigsberg were decided was rejected
by the Supreme Court in In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961). Years later, a University of Chicago
law professor said Anastaplo was "the staunchest Anti-Communist" he knew. See AUERBACH, supra
note 41, at 252 (quoting Malcolm Sharp).
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By 1957, a sputtering end to the Second Red Scare seemed visible.8 7 The
Supreme Court held in two cases that state restrictions on applicants to the bar
were unconstitutional. In Schware v. Board of Law Examiners,8 8 the Court held
New Mexico unconstitutionally prevented Schware from sitting for the bar exami-
nation. Schware's past membership in the Communist Party, and his use of aliases
when applying for jobs to avoid discrimination as a Jew were insufficient to ban him
from sitting for the New Mexico bar examination. The same day, the Court held, in
Konigsberg v. State Bar,89 that the California State Committee of Bar Examiners
lacked a rational reason to refuse to issue a good character certification required be-
fore an applicant was admitted to the bar. Konigsberg refused to answer questions
about his political affiliations (more specifically, whether he was or ever had been a
member of the Communist Party). The Court held the Committee did not base its
decision to refuse to issue the certificate of good character on Konigsberg's refusal.
Instead, it based its decision on "reasonable doubts about his good character," which
Konigsberg failed to dispel. Because no evidence existed to support the Commit-
tee's conclusion, the Court reversed.9 0
The ABA continued annually to renew the existence of the Special Commit-
tee on Communist Tactics through the 1950s, and it became a Standing Commit-
tee in 1962.91 Even so, its influence waned. For example, its Report for the 1958
ABA Annual Meeting was quite short. It proposed resolutions urging the House
of Delegates to lobby Congress to adopt laws overturning Supreme Court deci-
sions.92 The House declined to act on any of the three proposed resolutions.9 3
87. Though Joseph McCarthy died that year, the Supreme Court began a "retreat" from its ear-
lier cases concerning the constitutionality of anti-Communism measures from 1958-1962. See LUCAS
A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POuTICS 135-78 (2000) (discussing "retreat").
88. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
89. 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
90. Konigsberg's case returned to the Court in 1961. The Committee again denied him admis-
sion to the bar, this time deliberately on the ground that Konigsberg's refusal to answer questions
about any affiliation with the Communist Party was obstructionist. Konigsberg's obstructionism, it
concluded, prevented the Committee from determining whether he possessed required good moral
character. The Court upheld the state's decision to refuse to admit him to the bar. Konigsberg v.
State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
91. See Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 87 A.B.A. REP. 135 (1962) (approving Res-
olution to combine Special Committee on Communist Tactics and the Special Committee on Edu-
cation in the Contrast Between Liberty Under Law and Communism into a Standing Committee on
Communist Tactics).
92. Report of the Committee on Communist Tactics, Strategy and Objectives, 83 A.B.A. REP.
429 (1958). The decisions were Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) and Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116 (1958).
93. Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 83 A.B.A. REP. 151, 228 (1958). For the 1960
Annual Meeting, Communist Tactics offered a twenty-five page Report to justify a resolution to
create a program "to explain the nature, objectives and tactics of Communism, and its dangers
to our rights and freedoms." Report of the Special Committee on Communist Tactics, Strategy
and Objectives, 85 A.B.A. REP. 542, 542 (1960). It asked the House to print the Committee's Report
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Also less active and influential was the Special Committee on Individual
Rights. For example, it prepared no Report for the 1958 Annual meeting. In
1961-62, its membership was radically altered. Whitney North Seymour had
been followed as ABA President by Mississippi lawyer John C. Satterfield.94
Though both served on this Committee when it was created, they possessed
quite different views of its objectives. Satterfield packed the Committee with a
majority that linked racial unrest to Communism and the Supreme Court. Its Re-
port did little but quote Democratic Senator James Eastland of Mississippi criti-
cizing decisions of the Supreme Court.95 That screed was the last statement heard
from the Special Committee on Individual Rights. Though it was continued for
the 1962-63 year, it made no report. It was then abolished.
B. Professionalism and the Economics of Law Practice
By the late 1950s, the ABA turned from anti-Communism to issues of pro-
fessionalism, the standing of the bar, and lawyer incomes. In summer 1957, out-
going ABA President David Maxwell gave the customary annual address, titled
The Public View of the Legal Profession.96 Maxwell began with the assertion that
his travels as ABA President provided "abundant proof of what I had always
believed-that lawyers are everywhere dedicated to the public interest."97 Unfor-
tunately, the public was aware only of "the contumacious conduct of an infinites-
imal number of our profession who persist in flouting our canons of ethics."98
Maxwell first critically discussed the Konigsberg and Schware cases before turn-
ing to the "valid" criticism that the bar had failed "to carry out its obligation to
discipline its members."99 He closed by paraphrasing Roscoe Pound's definition
of a profession: The legal profession consisted of "an organized group of individ-
uals possessed of the same skills and training and devoted to the same aim of
serving the public interest."' That duty to the public required the ABA and
state supreme courts to work together "to give proper weight to the public interest
in disciplinary proceedings as opposed to the interest of the individual lawyer ac-
cused of misconduct."'0 '
Incoming ABA President Charles S. Rhyne also spoke at the 1957 Annual
Meeting. He emphasized Maxwell's challenge to the ABA by encouraging its
and send it to all members. This resolution was amended to print "a limited number of copies"
which would be "made available at Headquarters." Id. at 542 n.*.
94. On Satterfield, see http://clio.lib.olemiss.edu/cdm/landingpage/collection/satterfield
(last visited September 1, 2016).
95. Report of the Special Committee on Individual Rights as Affected by National Security,
87 A.B.A. REP. 726 (1962). The substance and tone of the Report prompted a dissent. Id. at 729.
96. David F. Maxwell, The Public View of the Profession, 82 A.B.A. REP. 362 (1957).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 368.
100. Id. at 372.
101. Id.
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members to "throw out of our Association those who violate the Canons of Eth-
ics."' 02 Rhyne also offered a pledge encompassing the beliefs and duties of the
lawyer, a pledge that emphasized the difference between the American demo-
cratic experiment and Communism.'0 3
The ABA Standing Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of the Law con-
cluded in its 1957 Report, "The biggest and most important problem facing the
American Bar as a profession today is that of the unauthorized practice of law
by laymen and by corporations."104 This problem could be resolved only by a sus-
tained effort by the bar to eliminate non-lawyers from the practice of law. The jus-
tification for this sustained effort was framed in the language of duty: Ending the
unauthorized practice of law not only aided "the welfare of the profession, but of
the public as well." 0 5 Eliminating the unauthorized practice of law prevented (or
limited) the negative effect of a turn to the morals of the marketplace, which would
arise should non-lawyers be permitted to compete with lawyers for legal business.
Rhyne's speech outlining his goals as President also emphasized the ABA's
need to help the "'grass roots' lawyers of the country."'06 Like the Unauthorized
Practice Committee, Rhyne recognized that, though ABA lawyers might be con-
cerned with Communism, many were also concerned about stalled incomes.
Rhyne created a Special Committee on Economics of Law Practice, which was
given "the duty of laying the groundwork for the development of practical sug-
gestions to lawyers designed to improve their economic status."o7 He appointed
future ABA President John C. Satterfield as chairman of the Special Committee.
The first proposal of the Economics of Law Practice Committee was to oppose
elimination of the negligence principle in auto accident cases. Turning such cases
into no fault matters was wrong because it "deprives a person of the right of recov-
ery of full compensatory damages upon proof of liability or of the right of trial by
jury,"-os not because such a change would lessen lawyer incomes. The bulk of the
Committee's Report was based on its conclusion that the "economic status of the
legal profession has failed to keep pace with other professions, businesses and skills
102. Sessions of the Assembly, 82 A.B.A. REP. 107, 127 (1957).
103. Id. at 128.
104. Report of the Standing Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of the Law, 82 A.B.A.
REP. 309, 309, 316 (1957).
105. Id.
106. Sessions of the Assembly, 82 A.B.A. REP. 107, 127 (1957). One reason for this concern
was a consequence of the drive to increase substantially the number of lawyers who were ABA
members. The number of lawyers who were members of the ABA in 1957 was 88,396, an increase
of 68 percent from the 52,624 members in 1954. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 290
(1989) (listing number of ABA members in selected years).
107. Report of Special Committee on Economics of Law Practice, 83 A.B.A. REP. 434, 435
(1958).
108. Id. at 434. This proposal was adopted by the House of Delegates. See Proceedings of the
House of Delegates, 83 A.B.A. REP. 151, 171 (1958).
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since the depression days of the early thirties."'09 It suggested four phases of what
it called "Operation Check-Up," with the ABA, state and local bar associations, in-
dividual lawyers and clients all working together to increase lawyer income. The
last group, clients, was included in Operation Check-Up because "encroachments"
on the practice of law by non-lawyers was "to the detriment of the clients.""o It
was the duty, then, of lawyers to remain "eternally vigilant""' in preventing
non-lawyers from generating such harm by practicing law." 2 The Special Commit-
tee also listed its intent to publish a number of works on the economics of law prac-
tice in addition to its initial pamphlet, The 1958 Lawyer and His 1938 Dollar. 113
The 1958 Lawyer and His 1938 Dollar was distributed to all 93,000 ABA
members"4 from its initial print run of 105,000 copies, which was paid for by
West Publishing Company. The 1959 Report of the Special Committee on Eco-
nomics of Law Practice noted that "demand has been so great" that West had re-
printed another 105,000 copies of the pamphlet.' "1 The number of American law-
yers was then approximately 262,000,1 16 making the pamphlet available to
virtually every American lawyer.
The Foreword to The 1958 Lawyer declared the Committee's task: "to ascer-
tain the causes which have resulted in the failure of lawyers to maintain an eco-
nomic status comparable to that of persons in other professions, businesses and
trades, and to propose definite remedial steps.""7 These remedial steps, the Com-
mittee emphasized, were to be taken in light of the fact that the "legal profession
is one primarily of service, and its success is measured by the benefits it confers
upon the Nation, the state, the community and their citizens."" 8 It continued:
"[O]ur profession has maintained its high ideals of ethics and of devotion to
the public interest without sufficient regard to the mundane matters of business,
109. Id. at 436. The Committee stated that "since 1929" "the income of all earners in the gen-
eral population increased 141 per cent, the income of our colleagues in the medical profession
climbed 157 per cent while the income of lawyers has risen only 58 per cent." Id.
110. Id. at 445. The Committee concluded that "reformers" (used in quotes in the Report)
favored such encroachments to "further[] their own selfish interests." Id.
111. This phrase was earlier used by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in dissent in one of
the Supreme Court's initial free speech cases. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
112. Report, supra note 107, at 444.
113. ABA SPEC. COMM. ON EcoN. OF L. PRAc., THE 1958 LAWYER AND His 1938 DOLLAR (1958
REPR. 1959) (hereinafter THE 1958 LAWYER).
114. See ABEL, supra note 106, at 280 (Table 22).
115. See Report of the Special Committee on Economics of Law Practice, 84 A.B.A. REP.
397, 399 (1959) (noting 70,000 additional copies were distributed to lawyers receiving West's ad-
vance sheets, and another 25,000 were printed to "for use to meet individual demand").
116. THE 1958 DISTRIBUTION OF LAWYERS IN THE UNITED STATES: A SUPPLEMENT TO PART I: Dis-
TRIBUTION OF LAWYERS IN THE UNITED STATES: DISTRIBUTION AND INcoME (1956) (1959) (listing 262,320
lawyers).
117. THE 1958 LAWYER, supra note 113, at 3.
118. Id.
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either from the viewpoint of business methods or reasonable compensation for
services rendered."19 The 1958 lawyer needed to adopt modern business meth-
ods in order to maintain an income permitting continued "devotion to the public
interest." As the pamphlet concluded, "To maintain their status in society, law-
yers must increase their net earnings."'20
The successful printing and re-printing of The 1958 Lawyer encouraged the
Committee to issue an Economics of Law Practice Series.'21 Chapter I of its second
pamphlet, Lawyers' Economic Problems and Some Bar Association Solutions,122
was titled The Economic Dilemma of the American Lawyer. The Committee did
not demonstrate in Chapter I any "dilemma;" instead, it reiterated the failure
since 1929 of non-salaried lawyer income (up 58 percent) to keep pace with in-
creases in income for those employed in other industries (up 131 percent), with
medical doctors (157 percent increase), and with dentists (83 percent increase).12 3
Indeed, the increase in income among all non-farm Self-employed Persons was 144
percent between 1929 and 1951.124 These data suggested, the Committee con-
cluded several times, "the future of the legal profession is endangered."12 5
Chapter II emphasized the need for "concerted, drastic action"' 26 to increase
lawyer income. Again, the lawyer's duty of public service was noted: "[I]t must be
remembered that the legal profession is one of service and its success is directly
related to its unselfish service rendered to our nation, our state, our community
and our citizenry. "127 Lawyers "should never permit the making of money to be-
come paramount to the rendition of service," for "the ethical standards of the pro-
fession should never be compromised, nor become subservient to selfish monetary
motives."'28 The remainder of Chapter II focused on the pricing of legal services,
particularly the trade-offs involved in minimum fee schedules, and of what to do
with the lawyer who consistently set his fees below the schedule.129
Lawyers' Economic Problems concluded that when a lawyer consistently
charged fees below the minimum schedule, his actions "may well point to soli-
119. Id.
120. Id. at 5.
121. Report of the Special Committee on Economics of Law Practice, 84 A.B.A. REP. 397,
398 (1959).
122. LAWYERS' EcONOMIC PROBLEMS AND SOME BAR ASSOCIATION SOLUTIONS (n.d. 1958-1959)
(hereinafter LAWYERS' EcONOMIC PROBLEMS).
123. Id. at 3.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2. See also id. at 3 ("The future of the legal profession has become endangered by
the creeping instability of its economic status."); id. at 13 ("It is no exaggeration to say that the
future of the legal profession is in danger.").
126. Id. at 15.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Chairman John C. Satterfield had established a minimum fee schedule in Mississippi when
he served as President of the Mississippi Bar Association in 1954-55. See http://www.olemiss.edu/
depts/general_1ibraryarchives/finding-aids/MUM00685.html#ref4 (last visited June 28, 2016).
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citation of professional employment on a basis not ethical under Canon 12."130
The Committee justified its conclusion on three bases: first, that the lawyer un-
dervalued his services; second, that the lawyer "wholly disregarded" customary
charges; and third, that the lawyer's action prevented another from obtaining em-
ployment "on the higher and reasonable fee basis."'3 1 These were not reasons,
but circular conclusions, none of which made paramount ethical standards to
"selfish monetary motives."
Both The 1958 Lawyer and Lawyers' Economic Problems renewed the atten-
tion of lawyers to the issue of "encroachments" from non-lawyers. The ABA had
a long-established Standing Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law. Its
goal was to protect the public (and, incidentally, lawyers) from non-lawyers who
performed legal work, for a "manifest public interest [was] involved in its elim-
ination."' 32 One persistent fear of lawyers in the late 1950s was the practice of
both law and accountancy by lawyer-accountants.'33
In 1960, Harvard Law School Professor A. James Casner, formerly a member
of the Unauthorized Practice Conmmittee, was appointed to the ABA's Standing
Committee on Professional Ethics. Casner had supported an active Unauthorized
Practice Committee, and his influence on the Professional Ethics Committee was
almost immediate. In early 1961, the Professional Ethics Committee issued ABA
Ethics Opinion 297.'13 It determined a lawyer-accountant who engaged in the prac-
tice of both law and accountancy violated Canon 27, which banned advertising.
The Professional Ethics Committee reiterated this Opinion the following year. In
Formal Opinion 305, the Committee declared Opinion 297 "was not intended to
preclude certified public accountants who are also lawyers but are holding them-
selves out only as accountants from engaging in activities permitted under the
Statement of Principles."'35
Neither Formal Opinion ended the debate. It continued in the ABA Journal,
with an article asking, "Is Dual Practice in the Public Interest?"136 The authors
130. LAWYERS' ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, supra note 122, at 26.
131. Id.
132. Report of the Standing Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of the Law, 82 A.B.A.
REP. 309, 309 (1957).
133. See Comment, The Attorney-Accountant: Ethical Problems in the Joint Practice of Law
and Accounting, 3 UCLA L. REV. 360 (1956); John R. Wilson, The Attorney-C.P.A. and the Dual
Practice Problem, 36 U. DET. L.J. 457 (1959).
134. ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 297 (1961). This
Opinion affirmed an earlier opinion banning a lawyer-accountant from practicing both professions
at the same time. ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 272 (1946).
135. ABA Standing Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
305 (1962).
136. Arthur J. Levy & W. D. Sprague, Accounting and Law: Is Dual Practice in the Public
Interest?, 52 ABA J. 1110 (1966).
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unequivocally decided the ABA and the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants should answer that question "clearly and plainly."' 37 The ABA's
Committee on Professional Ethics and Professional Responsibility finally did
so in 1972, essentially repealing its prior ban.'38
The Economics of Law Practice Committee continued to publish guides for
lawyers, most of which concerned more "technical" issues of law practice, and
which left unmentioned the lawyer's duty to the public interest.139 The Commit-
tee's importance to the ABA may be reflected in the 1961 decision to make it a
Standing Committee.140 The tension in improving lawyer incomes while serving
the public may be found in the Committee's 1962 Report, authored by its Chair-
man, and future ABA President, Lewis F. Powell, Jr.141 Powell wrote, "This
Committee has the responsibility for improving, properly and always with due
regard to the public interest, the economic status of lawyers. It is plainly in the
public interest that the economic health of the profession be safeguarded."142
In the early 1960s the ABA Journal occasionally reprised the issue of lagging
lawyer income in articles,143 but the essays became more nuancedi" By the mid-
1960s, the Journal limited its discussion of the economics of law practice to an as-
sessment of lawyer income,45 which showed steady increases in income. The 1965
IRS report indicated a 10 percent annual increase in "[t]otal legal service in-
come."146 A 1983 study of lawyer incomes from 1929 to 1979 showed median law-
yer income in constant 1983 dollars was twice as much in 1969 ($47,638) as it was
in 1947 ($25,415).147
137. Id. at 1116.
138. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 328 (1972).
139. See, e.g., ROBERT ASH, TAX PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN THE GENERAL PRACTICE OF LAW
(1960).
140. Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 86 A.B.A. REP. 351, 362-63 (1961).
141. On Powell, see JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. (1994).
142. Report of the Standing Committee on Economics of Law Practice, 87 A.B.A. REP. 597,
599 (1962).
143. Gerald C. Snyder, The Economic Anemia of the Legal Profession, 48 ABA J. 542
(1962).
144. See Stephen E. DeForest, Do Doctors Have the Answers to Lawyers' Economic Prob-
lems?, 48 ABA J. 442 (1962). He concluded: "It may be seriously questioned whether economic
equality with the medical profession is a desirable end, even if it were possible to achieve. Eco-
nomic success has not enhanced the status of the doctor in the community, it has not induced per-
sons of higher caliber to enter the profession, and it has not contributed to the general welfare of the
community." Id. at 445.
145. See John D. Conner & N. S. Clifton, Income of Lawyers, 1961-1962, 51 ABA J. 753
(1965); Cullen Smith & N. S. Clifton, Income ofLawyers, 1962-1963, 52 ABA J. 1043 (1966); Cul-
len Smith & N. S. Clifton, Income ofLawyers, 1965, 55 ABA J. 562 (1969).
146. Id. at 562.
147. Richard H. Sander & E. Douglass Williams, Why Are There So Many Lawyers? Per-
spectives on a Turbulent Market, 14 LAW & Soc. INQ. 431, 448 (1989) (Table 9).
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C. The Civil Rights Turn, 1962-1970
ABA President John C. Satterfield's address in August 1962 was a lengthy
(at 25 printed pages, it was two-and-a-half times longer than most presidential
addresses) and sustained attack on the Supreme Court.14 8 Satterfield noted that
its title, Law and Lawyers in a Changing World, might also be "appropriately"
called, "The Destruction of the United States of America."'4 9 As discussed
above, Satterfield's speech was seconded by the Report of the Special Committee
on Individual Rights, which too attacked the Supreme Court through the words of
the segregationist Senator from Mississippi, James Eastland.5 0
Tepidly noting the relationship between the public responsibilities of the bar
and the burgeoning civil rights movement was the 1962 Report of the Standing
Committee on Bill of Rights.'5 ' The Committee began by discussing the continuing
difficulty of unpopular clients obtaining legal representation. Its focus was triggered
by Yale Law Dean Eugene Rostow's'52 talk to the State Bar of California regarding
"strengthening the professional independence of the Bar,"' 53 subsequently pub-
lished in two parts in the ABA Journal. One of Rostow's proposals was for the
legal profession to embrace more firmly and fully the principle that lawyers possess
a duty to represent unpopular causes and persons. This principle, Rostow reminded
his listeners, had been affirmed by the ABA at its 1953 annual meeting.
The specifics of Rostow's talk, in turn, were triggered by the 1961 Report of
the Committee on Bill of Rights. That Report stated, "Complaints have come
from different areas where accused persons have been deprived of right to coun-
sel because of the refusal of members of the bar to represent discredited defen-
dants or become involved in unpopular cases."'54 The Committee declared
more specifically that "persons under criminal charges in certain sections of
the South have been deprived of their right to effective counsel because of the
refusal of lawyers of the Caucasian race to appear in the defense of colored de-
148. Address of the President, 87 A.B.A. REP. 516 (1962). It was reprinted in part in John C.
Satterfield, Law and Lawyers in a Changing World: The President's Annual Address, 48 ABA J.
922 (1962).
149. Address of the President, supra note 148, at 516.
150. Report of the Special Committee on Individual Rights as Affected by National Security,
87 A.B.A. REP. 726 (1962).
151. Report of the Standing Committee on Bill of Rights, 87 A.B.A. REP. 587 (1962).
152. On Rostow, see Geoffrey Kabaservice, Rostow, Eugene Victor, in YALE DICTIONARY at
469; Tributes, 113 YALE L.J. 1 et seq. (2003). See generally LAURA KALMAN, YALE LAW SCHOOL
AND THE SIXTIEs: REVOLT AND REVERBERATIONS (2005).
153. Eugene V. Rostow, The Lawyer and His Client (Part II), 48 ABA J. 146 (1962) (the talk
was given on September 28, 1961). See also Eugene V. Rostow, The Lawyer and His Client
(Part 1), 48 ABA J. 25 (1962).
154. Report of the Standing Committee on Bill of Rights, 86 A.B.A. Rep. 474, 476 (1961).
The conclusive language ("discredited defendants" and "unpopular cases") used by the Committee
may indicate its resistance to the substantive claims of those involved in the civil rights movement.
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fendants."' The Report noted that more cases concerning the "segregation prob-
lem" were likely to arise. It emphasized the ABA's "standing policy governing
the responsibility of its members to which the lawyers in every community
should adhere," and reprinted the 1953 Resolution.'56
Rostow concluded, "A visible and effective program for carrying out the
principle, as it was expressed in the American Bar Association's 1953 Resolu-
tion, could do more than any other single act to clarify public thought on the
role of law and lawyers in society."'57 He suggested adding the duty to represent
unpopular persons to the Canons of Ethics, to keep "the problem more firmly in
the foreground, both for lawyers and for bar associations."'58
The 1962 Report hedged on Rostow's proposals.159 After again quoting the
1953 Resolution, the ABA's recommended oath of admission of attorneys, and
Canon 31, the Committee concluded that the "Resolution recognizes the group re-
sponsibility of the profession, 'the duty of the bar,' to provide such aid, and the
'right' of the lawyer to defend in such causes without being penalized by public
opinion."' 60 The Report then discussed the results of a two-day meeting in May
with representatives from the National Bar Association (created by African-
American lawyers) and the National Lawyers Guild (consisting of lawyers on
the political left) about representing unpopular persons and causes. The Committee
Report made six findings, the first of which re-emphasized the group responsibility
of the bar to "see to it that defendants in unpopular causes obtain competent coun-
sel . . . [who] are not prejudiced or damaged by undertaking such representation
when requested."161
The ABA ventured a bit further after President John F. Kennedy's June 21,
1963 meeting with bar leaders, elite lawyers and lawyers who worked in the
civil rights field.162 Immediately after the meeting, Bernard J. Segal and Jerome
Shestak organized many of the lawyers attending the meeting (and others who
were unable to do so) into the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law.
The historian of the Lawyers' Committee notes that ABA President Sylvester C.
155. Id. This language may also reflect he biases of the Committee. The Report referred par-
ticularly to the "freedom riders," who in May 1961 began riding interstate buses without regard to
segregationist seating rules in Southern states, and who were then beaten while some law enforce-
ment officers watched, and then arrested. The Report was written by Rush H. Limbaugh. A series of
interviews of Limbaugh and a biographical summary is found in RUSH HUDSON LIMBAUGH AND His
TIMES: REFLECTIONS ON A LIFE WELL LIVED (George G. Suggs, Jr., ed., 2003).
156. Report, supra note 154, at 478.
157. Rostow, Part H, supra note 153, at 150.
158. Id.
159. Report of the Standing Committee on Bill of Rights, 87 A.B.A. REP. 578 (1962).
160. Id. at 578 (emphasis in original).
161. Id. at 580.
162. See ANN GARITY CONNELL, THE LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVE RIGHTS UNDER LAW: THE
MAKING OF A PUBLIC INTEREST LAW GROUP 77 & n.128 (2003) (listing attendees).
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Smith, Jr., was "wary of Kennedy's intentions."'63 The ABA Board of Governors
gave Smith permission to create a Special Committee on Civil Rights and Racial
Unrest to respond to the public service responsibilities and challenges the civil
rights movement created for lawyers.16 4 Walter Schweppe, chairman of the Stand-
ing Committee on Bill of Rights and a critic of the Supreme Court, was named
chairman of the Special Committee.'65 His appointment, and the appointment of
several others, indicated the ABA's "resistance to [President Kennedy's] civil
rights legislation."166 Even so, the Special Conmmittee successfully proposed to
the House of Delegates another re-affirmation of the duty of lawyers to represent
unpopular causes and clients.'67
The decision of the House of Delegates to reaffirm the 1953 Resolution did not
lead southern white lawyers to represent black civil rights protesters. In Mississippi
in summer 1963, "hundreds of [civil rights] activists who attempted to exercise
their rights of free speech and association" were "unjustly" arrested, and "[1]ocal
lawyers refused to represent black activists."'68 Despite this, the ABA Committee
on Bill of Rights wrote in its 1963 Report that it had received "no complaints"
about the inability of unpopular clients to find legal representation.'69
What the 1963 Report did not discuss were the costs borne by several southern
lawyers representing civil rights activists.170 Those lawyers who agreed to repre-
sent clients in civil rights school desegregation cases and other civil rights partic-
ipants, and lawyers who defended clients involved in criminal cases based on other
civil rights matters were subjected to official, social, and financial harm.
163. Id. at 80.
164. See Report of the Special Committee on Civil Rights and Racial Unrest, 88 A.B.A. REP.
614 (1963).
165. See 88 A.B.A. REP. 33 (listing members of Special Committee). Rush H. Limbaugh, the
former chairman of the Standing Committee, was also named to the Special Committee. As Connell
notes, Limbaugh "believed it was a positive comment on his community that it 'prided itself on the
fact that it never allowed a Negro to live in it and no Negro had ever lived there permanently.'"
CONNELL, supra note 162, at 80-81. A third member of the Committee on Bill of Rights, William
Gray of Los Angeles, was also named to the Special Committee.
166. Id. at 80.
167. Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 88 A.B.A. REP. 403, 424 (1963).
168. CONNELL, supra note 162, at 114.
169. Report of the Standing Committee on Bill of Rights, 88 A.B.A. REP. 496, 496 (1963).
170. See Daniel H. Pollitt, Counsel for the Unpopular Cause: The "Hazard of Being Un-
done," 43 N.C. L. REv. 9, 11-15 (1964) (reprinting part of Daniel H. Pollitt, Lawyers and Neglected
Clients, HARPER'S MAG., Aug. 1964, at 81). The problem was sufficiently widespread by 1961 that
the National Council on Legal Clinics published a pamphlet about how to defend such clients. See
DEFENDING THE UNPOPULAR CLIENT (Howard R. Sacks ed., 1961). It was joined by a film of the same
name hosted by the famous lawyer Edward Bennett Williams. See id. at 1. A year later, Williams
wrote a best-selling book which in part explained to the public the duty of the lawyer to defend the
unpopular client, a duty driven by the difference between the American political system and Com-
munism. See EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMS, ONE MAN's FREEDOM (1962).
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The most important change made by the ABA regarding its involvement
with the civil rights movement was structural: In 1966 it created a Section on In-
dividual Rights and Responsibilities (IRR Section), which "absorbed" the Stand-
ing Committees on American Citizenship and on Bill of Rights, as well as the
Special Committee on Civil Rights and Unrest. The founder and chairman of
the IRR Section, Jefferson Fordham, was a well-respected law dean who had
long promoted and defended the duty of the legal profession to protect the liber-
ties of Americans.17 '
The IRR Section'7 2 was founded "specifically to address civil rights and in-
dividual liberties,"173 and it took its charge seriously. The ABA appeared to
move in the same direction as the IRR Section. One example was the publication
by the ABA Journal of an article by William Marbury in April 1967.174 Marbury
was a well-known Baltimore lawyer who attended the June 21, 1963 meeting
with President Kennedy and who became a member of the Lawyers' Commit-
tee.175 He offered several examples of southern white lawyers refusing to repre-
sent black civil rights activists and concluded that lawyers had failed to "live up
to what we nobly profess."176 However, the problem was too large for the indi-
vidual American lawyer, who could not be expected "to run the risk of social and
professional ostracism the representation of the unpopular cause sometimes
brings."'77 Marbury's essay is premised on the belief that lawyers owed a duty
to the public to represent unpopular causes and clients. If the bar failed to em-
brace such a duty, it "should be ashamed to try to cover the situation up by
mouthing sanctimonious hypocrisies."178
The Lawyers' Committee on Civil Rights, supported by large law firms and
the Ford Foundation, became more involved in the civil rights movement. After
passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Mississippi board of Bar Commission-
ers adopted a resolution that its lawyers remain true to their oath by representing
171. See Jefferson Fordham, The Legal Profession and American Constitutionalism, 9 THE
RECORD 518 (1957). Albert Schweppe, the former chairman of the Bill of Rights Committee, served
as Vice-Chairman during the IRR Section's first year. By the following year he was no longer an
officer or otherwise listed.
172. For its history, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ADVANCING THE LAw, PROTECTING THE INDI-
VIDUAL, DEFENDING HUMAN DIGNITY, PURSUING THE CHALLENGES INTO THE 21ST CENTURY: A BRIEF HIS-
TORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (1999).
173. Id. at 9.
174. William L. Marbury, New Responsibilities for the Bar, 53 ABA J. 317 (1967).
175. See CONNELL, supra note 162, at 78 n.128. See also William L. Marbury Dead at 86;
Lawyer and Fellow at Harvard, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1988, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
1988/03/07/obituaries/william-l-marbury-dead-at-86-lawyer-and-a-fellow-of-harvard.html (last vis-
ited June 27, 2016). Marbury had also represented Alger Hiss, his childhood friend, in the libel suit
against Whittaker Chambers and assisted in Hiss's criminal trials. See generally WEINSTEIN, supra
note 33.
176. Marbury, supra note 174, at 318.
177. Id. at 319.
178. Id.
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competently the "popular or unpopular, respected or despised, and regardless of
race, color, creed or national origin" in all Mississippi courts.'7 9 The resolution
was, however, an "empty gesture."'8 0 Consequently, the Lawyers' Committee
opened a law office in Mississippi in 1965 to represent those who were unable
to obtain local lawyers as counsel.'8 '
By 1968, establishment lawyers were challenged by "Movement" lawyers,
those who supported the movements for black civil rights and the end of poverty,
for the student movement, and against the Vietnam War. At the 1968 annual
meeting of the National Lawyers Guild, UCLA law professor Richard Wasser-
strom spoke on the topic Lawyers and Revolution.182 Wasserstrom believed
that a radical lawyer, though not a contradiction in terms, was nevertheless an
unlikely combination.'8 3
Not all such self-identified lawyers agreed with Wasserstrom, at least not in
action. William Kunstler'84 became famous during the trial of the Chicago Eight
(later Seven) in late 1969 and early 1970.185 Soon after the trial, Kunstler was the
subject of a flattering profile in the Sunday New York Times Magazine.'86 Kunst-
ler declared, "I am not a lawyer for hire. I only defend those I love."'8 7
This was anathema to that part of the legal establishment which had fought
for the ideal that lawyers represented even those whose views were personally
repugnant. The June 1970 issue of the ABA Journal editorialized in opposition
to Kunstler's declaration. The editorial praised the "lawyer for hire," the lawyer
who "is available to the bad and the ugly, the scorned and the outcast."8 8 With-
out explicitly referring to the inability of those charged as Communists or those
civil rights activists in Mississippi (and elsewhere) to obtain counsel, it contin-
ued, "Most lawyers prefer to represent popular causes and prosperous clients,
but as a profession and individually we know that our ideal is to provide compe-
tent counsel for any person with a legitimate cause."'89 Indeed, "with respect to
179. CONNELL, supra note 162, at 131.
180. Id. (quoting Ten Year Report of the LCCR).
181. Id. at 132. The Mississippi Bar agreed to this arrangement as long as the Lawyers' Com-
mittee did not divert fee-paying clients from local lawyers. See id.
182. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers and Revolution, 30 U. PITT. L. REV. 125 (1968). This is
also published in RADICAL LAWYERS: THEIR ROLE IN THE MOVEMENT AND IN THE COURTS 74 (Jonathan
Black ed., 1971).
183. CONNELL, supra note 162, at 129-30.
184. On Kunstler, see DAVID J. LANGUM, WILLIAM KUNSTLER: THE MOST HATED LAWYER IN
AMERICA (1999); David J. Langum, Kunstler, William M., in YALE DICTIONARY at 320.
185. On the case, see generally JOHN SCHULTZ, THE CHICAGO CONSPIRACY TRIAL (rev. ed.,
1993).
186. Victor Navasky, Right On! With Lawyer William Kunstler, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 19,
1970, at 31.
187. Id. at 92.
188. See Richard Bentley et al., Editorial, A Lawyer for Hire, 56 ABA J. 552, 552 (1970).
189. Id.
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representing unpopular persons, not just poor ones, to be a 'lawyer for hire' is a
badge of honor."' 90
The editorial labeled Kunstler's approach "antiprofessional."'9' It was anti-
professional in light of the idealized claim of the bar that lawyers were profes-
sionals because they practiced law in the spirit of a public service. Representing
the unpopular cause or person meant acting fully in that spirit.
The ABA Journal printed a number of letters responding to its Kunstler ed-
itorial.' 92 One writer urged lawyers to live their ideal of serving the public: "Per-
haps this society would be a lot better off if lawyers developed the same social
conscience that befits members of a more rational lay society and worried
more about the public good they are supposed to represent, rather than the selfish
immediate interest of whoever pays the biggest fee."' 93 This argument was tell-
ing because it spoke in the common language of the dichotomy between profes-
sionalism and commercialism.
A 1970 Comment in the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
indirectly supported Kunstler's view. It challenged the ABA's idealization of
the lawyer for hire as dangerous to those lawyers who embraced it. The Comment
began, "It has become both professionally and legally dangerous to be a lawyer
representing the poor, minorities, and the politically unpopular."'94 It then listed
events in which lawyers were sanctioned or subject to discipline after represent-
ing such clients.
From 1968 through the early 1970s the bar's professed ideals were regularly
challenged for failing to meet the needs of those poor and minority persons in
need of legal assistance. More broadly, some Movement lawyers challenged
the American legal system. One response to these challenges was a symposium
organized by Whitney North Seymour for the 1970 centennial celebration of
the founding of the ABCNY.1 95 Seymour noted the ABCNY embraced the foun-
dational "belief of lawyers in the vibrancy of law."' 96 Did the law remain vi-
brant? The organizer and a principal speaker at the symposium was Eugene Ros-
tow. His response to the question of the symposium title, Is Law Dead?, was no.
Others were less certain. Several books indicting the legal profession for its fail-
ure to serve the interests of the public were published in 1970 and 1971.197
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Views of Our Readers, Kunstler and the Lawyer's Role, 56 ABA J. 716 (1970).
193. Letter from Harold Weiner, Kunstler and the Lawyer's Role, supra note 192, at 722.
194. Marshall Beil, Comment, Controlling Lawyers by Bar Associations and Courts, 5 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 301 (1970).
195. See Whitney North Seymour, Foreword, in Is LAW DEAD? 7 (Eugene V. Rostow ed.,
1971).
196. Id.
197. See WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: AN INDICTMENT OF THE LAW BY YOUNG ADVOCATES (Bruce
Wasserstein & Mark J. Green eds., 1970); LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE: ESSAYS To DEMYSTIFY LAW,
ORDER AND THE COURTS (Robert Lefcourt ed., 1971); RADICAL LAWYERS, supra note 181.
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The legal establishment re-asserted its commitment to public spirited (and
thus, professional) behavior during this challenge. The ABA continued its efforts
to foster civil legal aid, begun in 1964 when Lewis F. Powell, Jr., was ABA Pres-
ident. The ABA House of Delegates, after significant lobbying by Powell, agreed
to support the creation of a federal program of legal services for the poor.'9 8 it
defended the program against congressional efforts to abolish it,' 99 and supported
and lobbied for the creation of the Legal Services Corporation, first introduced in
1971 and enacted in 1974.200 The ABA, most notably through President Chester-
field Smith, urged lawyers to consider creating "an affirmative duty" to "devote
some portion of his services to public interest endeavors."20' The Lawyers' Com-
mittee remained committed to the cause of assisting the civil rights movement,
and large law firms began instituting formal pro bono programs. In 1974, the
Washington law firm of Hogan & Hartson hired David Tatel as its first pro
bono partner.202
By the end of the 1960s, large law firms wished to have their cake and eat it
too. They wished to represent heir well-paying clients and to be seen performing
public interest work. This maintained firm income and provided an effective tool
to recruit graduates of elite law schools, who wanted to practice law relevant to
the turbulent times.203 But the difficulty in maintaining the standard of the "law-
yer for hire" remained. In 1969, the Washington, D.C., law firm of Wilmer,
Cutler & Pickering sent a circular to law students declaring, "We decline to rep-
resent clients whose objectives or tactics we find unacceptable, or who ask us to
present a position on any basis other than its merits."204 The unpopular client was
198. See EARL JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE AMERICAN
LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM 39-43, 49-70 (2d ed. 1978). See also STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF
THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT 32-34 (2008) (discussing ABA's decision to support federal
civil legal aid program); JEFFRIES, supra note 141, at 197-201 (noting Powell's influence in obtain-
ing support by House of Delegates for legal services program). House of Delegates Proceedings, 90
A.B.A. REP. 95, 110-11 (1965) (noting vote). This reversed the ABA's position taken in 1950, dis-
cussed above.
199. John D. Robb, Controversial Cases and the Legal Services Program, 56 ABA J. 329,
329 (1970). This was the second time efforts were made to abolish it. See JOHNSON, supra note
198, at 219-33.
200. Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2996 et seq. (2015). The bill was signed
into law by President Richard M. Nixon on July 25, 1974, two weeks before he resigned from of-
fice, and just days before the House Committee on the Judiciary voted in favor of articles of im-
peachment. See EARL JOHNSON, JR., 2 To ESTABLISH JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF
CIVIL LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES 424 (3 vols., 2014).
201. Chesterfield Smith, Address of Chesterfield Smith, 26 ADMIN. L. REV. 379, 381 (1974).
See also Chesterfield Smith, Lawyers Should 'Tithe'for the Public Interest, 2 B. LEADER, Nov.-Dec.
1976, at 2.
202. CONNELL, supra note 162, at 195.
203. See Ghetto Law, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 19, 1970, at 55.
204. MARK J. GREEN, THE OTHER GOVERNMENT: THE UNSEEN POWER OF WASHINGTON LAWYERS
282 (1975).
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now a corporation alleged to have harmed the environment. Its unpopularity was
deserved, so it could be banished from the roster of the large firm's clients.
III. Crises of Professionalism
A. The Professionalism Crisis, 1973-1985
The 1970s were unkind to lawyers.20 5 The successful implementation of the
ABA's 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility206 rapidly gave way to a series
of crises. Watergate was the most well known, and elite lawyers accepted that the
Watergate affair was a "lawyers' scandal."207 During the Watergate hearings, in
February 1974, Senator John Tunney, chairman of a subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, held a hearing titled The Organized Bar: Self-
Serving or Serving the Public ?208 The hearing was held at the ABA's Midyear
Meeting in Houston, and part of the discussion concerned the duty of lawyers
to serve the public through pro bono work.
The ABA was confident its members generally acted in the spirit of a public
service. One way in which it later demonstrated the profession's commitment to
service to the public was the approval by its House of Delegates in 1975 of a res-
olution of the Special Committee on Public Interest Practice "that it is a basic
professional responsibility of each lawyer engaged in the practice of law to pro-
vide public interest services."209 The House of Delegates expanded the definition
of "public interest services" to include bar association activities as an aspect of
the administration of justice, but otherwise accepted the Special Committee's
definition to mean legal work, at a reduced or no fee, concerning poverty law,
civil rights law, public rights law, or charitable organization representation.210
205. See generally Michael Ariens, The Agony of Modern Legal Ethics, 1970-1985, 5 ST.
MARY'S J. oN LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 134 (2014).
206. The ABA House of Delegates adopted the Code without amendment in 1969. See Pro-
ceedings of the House of Delegates, 94 A.B.A. REP. 378, 389-92 (1969). In just three years, forty-
three states and the District of Columbia had adopted the Code as law. Four bar associations
adopted the Code as applicable to their members. Only three states had not taken some action con-
cerning the Code by 1972. See Report of Special Committee to Secure Adoption of the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, 97 A.B.A. REP. 740, 741 (1972).
207. See Richard B. Allen, et al., Editorial, Watergate-A Lawyers' Scandal?, 60 ABA J.
1257 (1974) (quoting past ABA President Chesterfield Smith's observation); James D. Fellers,
President's Page, 61 ABA J. 529, 529 (1975) ("Early in its development, Watergate was charac-
terized as a lawyer's scandal.").
208. The Organized Bar: Self-Serving or Serving the Public?: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
On Representation of Citizen Interests of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. (1974).
209. See House of Delegates Proceedings, 100 A.B.A. REP. 642, 684 (1975). The House of
Delegates amended the Special Committee's resolution by replacing "obligation" with "responsibil-
ity." See Report of the Special Committee on Public Interest Practice, 100 A.B.A. REP. 965 (1975)
(printing original resolution).
210. House of Delegates Proceedings, 100 A.B.A. REP. at 684. The House of Delegates had
postponed its consideration of the Special Committee's Resolution at its Midyear Meeting in part
due to the more limited definition of public interest services in the Committee's Resolution. Com-
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Two years later, at the behest of the House of Delegates, the Special Com-
mittee issued a Report titled Implementing the Lawyer's Public Interest Obliga-
tion.2 11 Implementing this duty required private practice lawyers to keep records
of their pro bono work and commit five to ten percent of their time to such prac-
tice. The ABA's declaration of the lawyer's professional responsibility to engage
in public interest work indicates the strength of the social trustee model in the
middle of the decade.
That vision was reinforced in a talk to the IRR Section given by former
Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox just days after the resignation of
President Richard Nixon in August 1974.212 Cox implored his listeners to medi-
ate the "conflicting duties of 'hired gun' and 'servant of the law.' "213 One of the
charges hurled at those many lawyers involved in the Watergate affair was their
failure to consider any interest other than their client's. Cox noted, "under mod-
ern circumstances loyalty is often more easily given to the client's interests than
to the people's interests or the law." 2 14
In 1977, ABA President William B. Spann, Jr., created what became known
as the Kutak Commission, which proposed the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, adopted by the ABA in 1983.215
The Kutak Commission and the ABA agreed the lawyer was a central actor
in the American democratic experiment, and one who largely acted for the good
of society. The major goal of the Kutak Commission was to craft a set of ethics
rules that declared the profession's adherence to the model of social trustee pro-
fessionalism. A crucial part of the Commission's job was to reflect the ideal that
private practice lawyers were professionals who acted in the spirit of public ser-
vice, as both agents of their clients and as trustees of the public interest. After
meeting privately for a year-and-a-half, the Commission members were asked
what the public should know about its initial draft. Two recorded responses
were, "An authoritative statement that lawyers are responsible to demands be-
pare Report of the Special Committee on Public Interest Practice, 100 A.B.A. REP. 392 (1975)
(printing original resolution postponed at Midyear Meeting) with Report of the Special Committee
on Public Interest Practice, 100 A.B.A. REP. 965 (1975) (printing amended resolution filed for An-
nual Meeting).
211. See Implementing the Lawyer's Public Interest Obligation, 63 ABA J. 678 (1977) (re-
printing report in part). Report of the Special Committee on Public Interest Practice, 102 A.B.A.
REP. 868 (1977) (reprinting report in part). The Report used its original word "obligation," not "re-
sponsibility," as the resolution was approved by the ABA House of Delegates.
212. Cox had been fired as independent counsel investigating Watergate in the notorious Sa-
turday Night Massacre. See KEN GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD Cox 338-58 (1997).
213. Archibald Cox, The Loss ofMystical Qualities Makes It Harder to Revere the Law, STU-
DENT LAw., Feb. 1975, at 8, 10.
214. Id. at 10.
215. See William B. Spann, Jr., The Legal Profession Needs a New Code of Ethics, 2 B.
LEADER, Nov.-Dec. 1977, at 2, 3. See also Ariens, supra note 8, at 700-20 (detailing history of
Kutak Commission's efforts).
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yond those of their immediate clients," and "Regulation of a private profession in
the public interest. "216 Shortly before the Kutak Commission's "Working Draft"
was first made public in mid-1979, one Commission member was quoted, "A
lawyer's duty is not solely to protect the confidences of the client. A lawyer
has some duty and obligation with respect to the administration of justice, of can-
dor to the court."2 17 These statements were the Commission's response to what
its Reporter called the lawyer's "basic posture" of "my client first, last and
always."218
In both the 1979 "Working Draft" and the January 1980 Discussion Draft,
the Kutak Commission included a proposal requiring lawyers to engage in pro
bono activities.2 19 It also included several provisions requiring or permitting a
lawyer to disclose a client confidence, and provisions in which the lawyer was
required to consider the interests of persons other than the lawyer's client before
or when engaging in a professional action.220
The Discussion Draft was savaged. Publication of the Proposed Final Draft
was delayed to respond to extensive criticism from bar associations, ABA Sec-
tions and Committees, and individuals. When it was finally published in mid-
1981, the Kutak Commission had made significant changes. The pro bono man-
date was abandoned, though over the dissent of two members. The Proposed
Final Draft reduced the number of instances in which a lawyer was required to
act beyond any consideration of her client's interests, including provisions per-
mitting a lawyer to disclose a client confidence.
Despite the changes made in the eighteen months between publication of the
Discussion Draft and the Proposed Final Draft, Chairman Robert Kutak still
spoke in the language of social trustee professionalism in his Introduction to
the Proposed Final Draft. He noted that "questions remain" concerning the
shape of the lawyer's duties: "What are the lawyer's duties to the court? What
are the limits of duty to a client? Does a client have a right to use illegal or
wrongful means to gain his objectives? Does a client have a right to the assistance
of a lawyer in the process?"221
The ABA House of Delegates possessed the institutional authority to answer
the questions posed by Kutak. When the House began debating the Model Rules
216. CoMiISSIoN ON EVALUATION OF ETHICAL STANDARDS JOURNALS, RESEARCH TRIANGLE, NORTH
CAROLINA, FEBRUARY 23-24, 1979, at 12 (copy on file with author) (hereinafter JOURNALS).
217. See Say Revised Ethics Code Will Be 'Enforceable', 65 ABA J. 1283, 1283 (1979)
(quoting Commission member Richard Sinkfield); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Chair-
man's Introduction (AM. BAR Ass'N, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT 1981).
218. JOURNALS, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, JUNE 29-30, 1979, supra note 216, at 16 (quoting Re-
porter Geoffrey Hazard). Even though this statement was made near the end of the Commission's
meetings, it represents the Commission's ethos from its first meeting in 1977.
219. See Ariens, supra note 8, at 705-06.
220. See id.
221. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Chairman's Introduction, at iii (AM. BAR AsS'N, PRO-
POSED FINAL DRAFT 1981).
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in August 1982, its answers were framed in favor of the interest of the lawyers'
clients. This bias was manifested even after the Kutak Commission made further
alterations to the proposed Model Rules between 1981 and 1982, which tied the
lawyer more tightly to the needs and interests of the client.22 2
The Kutak Commission's 1982 Final Draft was accompanied by a Report
written by Robert Kutak. Kutak now emphasized the lawyer's duty of loyalty
to the client. More importantly, Kutak avoided any mention of any duty to the
public in his Report. The shorthand often used for the lawyer's public duties
was that the lawyer also acted as an "officer of the court." This shorthand was
prominently used in Kutak's Introduction to the 1981 Proposed Final Draft.22 3
It was eliminated from his 1982 Report.224
Despite these changes by the Kutak Commission, those in the House of Del-
egates who favored the "basic posture" of "my client, first, last and always"
wanted more. In the 1982 proceedings of the House, the debate was so extensive
that the House completed work on just a few rules, and failed to complete any
substantive review of Model Rule 1.6 on client confidences and exceptions
thereto.225 At this and the February 1983 meeting on the proposed Rules, those
opposed to social trustee professionalism largely succeeded.22 6 For example,
the instances in which a lawyer was permitted to disclose a client confidence
to effectuate a public interest were further reduced in number.227
By the time the Model Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted by the
ABA House of Delegates in August 1983, the Kutak Commission's goal had been
transformed. Instead of generating a set of rules that accounted for the lawyer's
duty to client and public, the rules were written to determine when the lawyer had
engaged in "lawful" behavior. The Model Rules were to be interpreted as rules,
not guides, and the "basic posture" of "my client first, last and always," was now
central to the Model Rules.
This six-year process occurred as a number of other changes re-shaped the
legal profession. The number of lawyers increased by 53 percent during the
1970s, as baby boomers filled all existing law school seats.228 From 1980 to
1984, the number of lawyers grew an additional 20 percent, to over 649,000.229
222. See Ariens, supra note 8, at 718-20.
223. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFr, Chairman's Introduction, at 4 (noting that a lawyer is not only "a
representative of the client but also an officer of the court.").
224. See Report of the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, 107 A.B.A.
REP. 828 (1982).
225. See House of Delegates Proceedings, 107 A.B.A. REP. 603, 627-28 (1982).
226. Ariens, supra note 8, at 737-41. It should be noted that votes were often closely divided.
227. See House of Delegates Proceedings, 108 A.B.A. REP. 289 (1983).
228. See THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE U.S. LEGAL PROFES-
SION IN THE 1980s, at 4 (Barbara A. Curran et al. eds., 1985) (noting increase in lawyers from
355,242 in 1970 to 542,205 in 1980).
229. See Barbara A. Curran, American Lawyers in the 1980s: A Profession in Transition, 20
LAW AND Soc'Y REv. 19, 19 (1986).
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Median lawyer income fell precipitously. In constant 1983 dollars, the median law-
yer's income dropped from $47,638 in 1969 to $36,716 in 1979.230 Large law firms
pursued growth and profits, as legal services between 1972 and 1982 increasingly
came from businesses rather than individuals.23' Between 1977 and 1982, total
monies received by private practice lawyers doubled to $34 billion. 232 This shift
provided the impetus for large firms to increase the pace of growth.233 The average
size of the twenty largest law firms increased from 234 in 1979 to 318 in 1982 and
414 in 1985, increases of 36 percent and 30 percent, respectively.2 34 Private law
practice had become, as Robert Kutak, Chairman of the Kutak Commission
wrote in a posthumously published 1984 essay, a "dog-eat-dog world." 2 35
It was in this milieu that Peter Megargee Brown and others spoke at the 1983
ABA presidential showcase. Brown sensed a swift and dramatic change within the
legal profession. Brown also correctly noted that the Model Rules were not only
unhelpful in remedying the problem of a lack of lawyer professionalism, they ex-
acerbated it. The ABA understood the problem that competition for legal business
made assertions of professionalism ring hollow. And it used its significant re-
sources to highlight this difficulty. But though claims of "antiprofessional" beha-
vior persisted through the 1980s, it was rare to hear or read any rejoinder from
large firm lawyers. Their indirect response was in the form of the now-legally per-
missible targeted marketing of the large firm's claims to technical expertise.
B. The Professionalism Crisis, 1895-1925
In 1923, W. A. Wright, President of the Texas Bar Association, told its
members that they had "overlooked" their adoption of the ABA's 1908 Canons
of Ethics in 1909.236 Three years later, the Association again adopted the Canons,
which, as a voluntary association, meant only that its members could be expelled
from the Association for violating the Canons. A few years before Wright spoke,
John C. Townes, major in the United States Army and the long-time dean of the
University of Texas Law Department, asked the Association to adopt a resolution
excoriating lawyers who aided their clients in receiving a deferral from the local
draft board through false means. Townes asked that the Association by resolution
230. Sander & Williams, supra note 147, at 448 tbl.9. See also ABEL, supra note 106, at 160
(noting several state bar surveys from the 1970s indicating a decline in lawyer income).
231. Sander & Williams, supra note 147, at 441 tbl. 5 (noting law firm receipts between 1972
and 1982 from individuals dropped from 52.5 percent to 44.5 percent and increased from businesses
from 42.3 percent to 48.6 percent).
232. See Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer's Professional Independence: Memories, Aspira-
tions, and Realities, in AN IDEAL REVISITED, supra note 11, at 49.
233. The pace of growth was reflected in the mid-1980s increase by Cravath, Swaine and
Moore of new associate salaries.
234. ABEL, supra note 106, at 311 tbl. 45.c.
235. Robert J. Kutak, The Adversary System and the Practice of Law in THE GOOD LAWYER
172, 175 (David Luban ed., 1984).
236. See MICHAEL ARIENS, LONE STAR LAW: A LEGAL HISTORY OF TEXAS 184 (2011).
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summarily dismiss those lawyers and that they be "disbarred by competent au-
thority from the further practice of law." 237 Instead of a quick affirmation of
Townes's request, the Association's members bickered for two days regarding
the proper standards for disbarment, with one noting that the Texas statute on dis-
barment was "practically unused."238
In spite of the efforts of the elite of the bar, including the ABA, to direct the
broader profession's attention to the threat to professionalism from the late 1890s
through the 1920s, relatively little happened. The ABA adopted its Canons of Eth-
ics in 1908,239 and many state bar associations, all of which were then voluntary,
adopted them. Additionally, lawyers reached a tacit agreement concerning the ex-
tent to which the lawyer zealously represented his client in the courtroom.24 0 A few
more lawyers were disbarred as time passed, but hey were a paltry few.241
During the last two decades of the 19th century, the number of lawyers
nearly doubled.242 Although growth slowed substantially in the first two decades
of the twentieth century, by 1920 the number of licensed lawyers was 120,781.243
237. Id. at 181 (quoting 37 PROC. TEX. B. Ass'N 52, 59 (1918)).
238. Id.
239. See Transactions of the Thirty-first Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association,
Discussion Upon Canons of Ethics, 33 A.B.A. REP. 3, 55, 86 (1908). See generally James M. Alt-
man, Considering the A.B.A.'s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2395 (2003).
240. See Michael Ariens, Brougham's Ghost, 35 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 263, 289-97 (2015).
241. Id. at 293 n.184 (listing numbers). A Westlaw search in the "allstates" file using the





Using the same file, a Boolean search "roll w/5 attorney & stri! & da(bef 1930)" found the follow-





242. See JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE
WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 60 (2004) (noting census reports indicating increase
from 64,137 lawyers in 1880 to 114,460 in 1900). As noted by Terence C. Halliday, who lists
slightly different numbers, these census totals included notaries and others not admitted to this
bar. See Terence C. Halliday, Six Score Years and Ten: Demographic Transitions in the American
Legal Profession, 20 LAW AND Soc'Y REV. 53, 62 (1986). See also ROBERT A. SILVERMAN, LAW AND
URBAN GROWTH: CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE BOSTON TRIAL COURTS, 1880-1900, at 75 (1981) (noting
number of Boston lawyers doubled during this time).
243. Halliday, supra note 242, at 62. The number of students enrolled in law schools rose
from 1,653 in 1870 to 19,567 in 1910. See WAYNE K. HOBSON, THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION
AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY, 1890-1930, at 108 tbl. 1 (1986).
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For some elite lawyers, this was entirely too many. John Dos Passos wrote, in all
capital letters, "The excessive number of lawyers, is detrimental, both to the com-
munity and the morale, of the profession."24 4
On the one hand, the threat to professionalism came from the "shyster," the
"ambulance chaser," and the "pettifogger."245 These lawyers, declared the bar's
elite, abused the contingent fee system and thus failed to "secure justice."246 On
the other hand, President Theodore Roosevelt criticized the elite corporation lawyer
for aiding the powerful in finding ways to "override and circumvent the law."2 47
The elite of the bar wrote extensively about the decline of the legal profes-
sion, and did not spare themselves. In a 1901 Yale Law Journal article, San Fran-
cisco lawyer George Shelton quoted the late robber baron Jay Gould: "[B]rains
were the cheapest meat in the market."248 Two years later, Yale published an-
other "decline and fall" essay, The Decadence of Law as a Profession and Its
Growth as a Business.249 Dos Passos's 1907 book The American Lawyer rued
the turn of the practice of law from a profession to a business, a process Dos
Passos concluded had begun shortly after the Civil War.250 The theme throughout
these writings was the lawyer's loss of independence from the client. As yet an-
other early twentieth century Yale Law Journal article put it, "Nowadays the big-
ger the lawyer, the more he becomes the clerk, the hired man of the business
man."25 ' This lamentation was heard for the next decade.252
Though the members of the Texas Bar Association found it unnecessary im-
mediately to re-adopt the Canons of Ethics when called to its members' attention
in 1923, the ABA was already working in a more urgent fashion. In 1922, the
244. JOHN Dos PASSOS, THE AMERICAN LAWYER-As HE WAs-As HE Is As HE CAN BE 175
(1907).
245. See Ariens, supra note 240, at 290 and nn.161-163 (citing articles attacking shysters and
pettifoggers).
246. The Abuse of Personal Injury Litigation, 18 GREEN BAG 193, 202 (1906). See Transac-
tions, supra note 239, at 61-80 (reporting discussion of and amendment to Canon 13 regarding con-
tingent fee).
247. Theodore Roosevelt, Address at Harvard University (June 28, 1905), in 4 THEODORE
ROOSEVELT, PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES AND STATE PAPERS 407, 419-20 (1910). See also The Opportu-
nity in the Law, 39 AM. L. REV. 555 (1905) (publishing address by Louis D. Brandeis attacking bar's
materialism).
248. George F. Shelton, Law as a Business, 10 YALE L.J. 275, 276 (1901).
249. Robert T. Platt, The Decadence of Law as a Profession and its Growth as a Business, 12
YALE L.J. 441 (1903).
250. See Dos PAssos, supra note 244, at 46 (declaring "law has become a business").
251. Champ S. Andrews, The Law-A Business or a Profession?, 17 YALE L.J. 602, 608
(1908).
252. See George W. Bristol, The Passing of the Legal Profession, 22 YALE L.J. 590 (1913);
JULIUS H. COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? (1979) (rev. ed. G. A. Jennings Co. 1924).
Canon 12 of the 1908 Canons of Ethics declared, "In fixing fees it should never be forgotten
that the profession is a branch of the administration of justice and not a mere money-getting
trade." Canon 12, ABA CANONS OF ETHICS (1908).
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chairman of the ABA's Committee on Professional Ethics, Thomas Francis
Howe, wrote: "The ever increasing complexities of modern business, the rapid
changes in its methods, and the relations of lawyers thereto, are constantly raising
questions concerning proper professional conduct that were not contemplated-
or even dreamed of-when the canons were prepared."25 3 In 1924, the ABA cre-
ated a Committee on Supplements to Canons of Ethics,254 and the following year
one of the Committee's members, Henry Sims, discussed three problems of pro-
fessional ethics in the ABA Journal.255 The articles discussed in turn the nature
and extent of the lawyer's ethical duties to the court, his client, and the bar.
While writing particularly of the lawyer's duty to his client, Sims concluded
the lawyer's duty was founded on "the lawyer's conscience."256 Following one's
conscience did not make the lawyer's task any easier. For example, in represent-
ing a client, "We must admit then, that it is exceedingly difficult to delimit the
field in which the lawyer may exercise his conscience, as to the presentation of
a claim or defense."257 The "practical solution" was, "it is entirely a matter of
purpose and common sense."25 8
The Special Committee presented the ABA with its proposed Supplements
to the Canons in 1927.259 The final proposed Canon, Summary of the Professional
Ideals of the Lawyer, offered a set of ten numbered principles (with occasional
subparts) variously touching on the lawyer's duties to client, court, fellow law-
yers, society, and government.260 These duties included the duty of representing
the unpopular cause or client, the duty "not to refuse to serve the pauper, nor to
[refuse to] defend those accused of crime, however heinous."261
One member dissented from this proposed Canon.262 F. W. Grinnell con-
cluded the Committee was mistaken if it believed this Canon would overcome
253. Thomas Francis Howe, The Proposed Amendment o the By-Laws, 8 ABA J. 436, 436
(1922). Howe wrote to support a change to the by-laws of the Committee on Professional Ethics
permitting it to draft and published opinions interpreting the Canons. See id. at 379 (printing pro-
posed amendments).
254. 47 A.B.A. REP. 26 (1924) (listing members of Special Committee).
255. See Henry Upson Sims, The First Problem of Professional Ethics, 11 ABA J. 63 (1925);
Henry Upson Sims, The Second Problem of Professional Ethics: The Lawyer's Duty to His Client,
11 ABA J. 127 (1925); Henry Upson Sims, The Third Problem: The Lawyer's Duty to the Bar, 11
ABA J. 396 (1925).
256. Sims, Second Problem, supra note 255, at 128.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Report of the Special Committee on Supplements to the Canons of Ethics, 50 A.B.A.
REP. 372 (1927). This Report was also published as Proposed Supplements to Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics, 13 ABA J. 268 (1927).
260. Report, supra note 259, at 382-85; Proposed Supplements, supra note 259, at 271-73.
261. Report, supra note 259, at 384; Proposed Supplements, supra note 259, at 272.
262. See Report, supra note 259, at 387-95 (printing Minority Report of F. W. Grinnell); Pro-
posed Supplements, supra note 259, at 273-75. Grinnell also dissented concerning two other pro-
posed canons.
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the "tendency on the part of a considerable number of the Bar . . . 'to regard the
canons of ethics as completely covering the field, so that everything not forbidden
by the canons is permitted.' "263 A summary that focused on "dogmatic" state-
ments "containing sweeping prohibitions" was "inadvisable." Better, Grinnell be-
lieved, that the ABA offer what today are called "best practices," for "[t]he pur-
pose of the canons is to assist lawyers by stimulating their imagination as to
sound professional behavior."264
When the Committee returned the following year with its final Report, it
abandoned this proposed Canon. The absence of the Summary was unmentioned
in the debate on adopting the proposed Canons. After some debate concerning the
ethics of a division of fees, the supplemental Canons were adopted.265 Before the
supplemental Canons were adopted, Newman Levy,266 a criminal defense lawyer
in New York City, wrote an article for Harper's titled Lawyers and Morals.267
Levy wrote a stinging critique of the elite bar's failure to acknowledge the dis-
connection between professional "aspirations" and actual "conduct."2 68 Elites
made regular efforts to "purge the bar of shysters," for such lawyers behaved
without regard to the high status of the lawyer as professional. But these efforts
were more about directing the attention of the public away from the "guardians of
the aristocratic tradition" than "purging" the bar. The guardians drew attention
away from themselves because they were as much workers for hire as the lowest
criminal defense shyster. And no changes to the canons of ethics would solve the
problems of lawyer dependence and subservience to clients, for the canons con-
cerned "manners rather than morals."269
For the vast majority of lawyers practicing during the first three decades of
the twentieth century, the Canons of Ethics meant nothing. As a member of the
Special Committee on Supplements to the Canons of Ethics noted, "Many of the
honorable members of the Bar have never read the canons of ethics and rightly
consider that they know how to conduct themselves properly without reference
to any written rule." 270 Those puny few who were disbarred failed to serve
even as an in terrorem reminder to most of the bar.
263. Report, supra note 259, at 391; Proposed Supplements, supra note 259, at 274 (quoting
Walter Taylor, a member of the Committee who died before the 1927 Report was completed).
264. Report, supra note 259, at 394; Proposed Supplements, supra note 259, at 275.
265. See Report of the Special Committee on Supplements to the Canons of Professional Eth-
ics, 51 A.B.A. REP. 495 (1928) (printing supplemental Canons). The ABA approved the additional
Canons. See Proceedings at the Fifty-First Meeting of the American Bar Association, 51 A.B.A.
REP. 29, 119, 130 (1928).
266. On Levy, see NEWMAN LEVY, My DOUBLE LIFE: ADVENTURES IN LAW AND LETTERS (1958);
Newman Levy is Dead at 77; Lawyer Noted for Light Verse, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 23, 1966, at 47.
267. Newman Levy, Lawyers and Morals, HARPER'S MTHLY MAG., Feb. 1927, at 288.
268. Id. at 289.
269. Id.
270. Report, supra note 259, at 392; Proposed Supplements, supra note 259, at 274 (quoting
Taylor).
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The value of the ABA Canons of Ethics was not in teaching the 100,000 or so
lawyers who were not members of the ABA how to act (or, more precisely, how
not to act); it was in reminding its own members, at least faintly, of their obliga-
tions beyond one's duty to one's clients. In this sense the Canons of Ethics
acted as a slight, but occasionally effective, claim upon their conscience. This re-
minder was taught again and again because it's so easy to forget in the hurly-burly
of practice. Levy brought to the attention of the bar elite that they failed to act as
they demanded others do. Levy asked elite lawyers to search their consciences.
Grinnell and Sims noted that the lawyer might be nudged to act more conscien-
tiously, and though precious little, that was the best the profession might do.
C. Tipping
The ABA's rejection of a Canon concerning a Summary of the Professional
Ideals of a Lawyer had no appreciable effect on the conduct of lawyers for the
next forty years. From 1925 through 1965, lawyers were largely guided by
their conscience in matters of legal ethics. Particularly in the two decades follow-
ing the end of World War II, lawyers were regularly reminded that their con-
science should be guided by their duty as social trustees. Though the bar elite
worried about the "infinitesimal" few who acted as "ethics-busters," legal ethics
issues were never at the forefront of the profession's concerns through the mid-
1960s. Even when ABA President Lewis Powell created a Special Committee on
Evaluation of Ethical Standards in 1964, its impetus was not a crisis in the pro-
fession. This relative professional quiescence may be why the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility was adopted without amendment and with little debate in
1969. The significant ideological challenges to the legal profession's orthodoxy
beginning in the late 1960s were joined by economic challenges in the early
1970s. These threats undermined the comfortable assertions that the mere exis-
tence of a code of legal ethics was sufficient to channel the behavior of lawyers.
The bar elite perceived the "lawyers' scandal" of Watergate as a tipping point to
remind the profession of their duty as social trustees, which generated the crea-
tion of the Kutak Commission. The result of the Kutak Commission's work was
an instantiation of the profession's rejection of social trustee professionalism.
Mark Green, a lawyer who criticized the legal profession in a number of
books in the 1970s, directed a project for Public Citizen which sought "to per-
suade lawyers to be more responsive to client and community."271 Although sev-
eral of the six bar associations Public Citizen studied in the mid-1970s had
worked to improve the delivery of legal services to "Americans of moderate
means," most remained stuck in their ways. That included lax discipline of law-
yers. The authors of Bringing the Bar to Justice noted a number of examples of
egregious behavior by lawyers subject to few disciplinary sanctions.272
271. Mark Green, Introduction in SHARON TISHER & LYNN BERNABEI, BRINGING THE BAR TO Jus-
TICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF Six BAR ASSOCIATIONS ii (1977).
272. See id. at 86-117.
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The failure of the bar to discipline its lawyers was, at least, a consistent fail-
ure. In an 1896 speech to the ABA, a lawyer noted, "I know of no Bar in the
country which attempts to purge itself with any thoroughness."27 3 Indeed, the
"profession cannot undertake to protect society by guaranteeing the moral char-
acter of its members."27 4 In the late 1920s, the Conference of Bar Association
Delegates noted the "apathy" of the bar in following through disciplinary com-
plaints. This was troublesome because the "increased importance of the lawyer
and the great increase in the number of persons in the practice of the law
make necessary more adequate methods of discipline."275 In his 1957 ABA Pres-
idential Address, David Maxwell found the failure to discipline "ethics-busters"
brought "great discredit" onto the profession.276 A popular book published a de-
cade later detailed the lack of disciplinary enforcement.277 Although the ABA's
1970 Clark Report offered a structure for disciplinary enforcement, lawyers re-
mained largely unaffected by such reform through the mid-1970s.27 8
The authors of Bringing the Bar to Justice also claimed lawyers failed to un-
dertake sufficient pro bono work. It reported on a study by the District of Colum-
bia Bar Association indicating 17 percent of sole practitioners spent 20 percent or
more of their time on pro bono work, compared with just 5 percent of lawyers in
medium-sized firms and 4 percent of lawyers in large firms.2 79 More alarming, a
lawyer at Covington & Burling, a large Washington firm, stated that students in-
terviewing in the mid-1970s for new associate positions "hardly ever asked now"
if the firm had a pro bono program.280 In the 1960s, Baltimore lawyer William
Marbury had urged ABA members to fulfill their duty as professionals by repre-
senting civil rights activists. By the mid-1970s, his firm, Piper & Marbury, had
closed its pro bono branch office.281
Even as the ABA encouraged its members to make pro bono work a part of
their practice, change was coming. If the ABA was going to implement the pro-
fessional obligation of lawyers to perform pro bono work, it was going to have to
do so in the face of changing economic and ideological circumstances.
The charge to the Kutak Commission was to look at "all facets of legal eth-
ics." 2 82 All facets of legal ethics included ideas for more effective disciplinary
enforcement and pro bono work, both of which were aspects of the lawyer's pub-
lic responsibility. Although excoriating the slack and inefficient lawyer disciplin-
273. Joseph B. Warner, The Responsibilities of the Lawyer, 19 A.B.A. REP. 319, 339 (1896).
274. Id.
275. Conference of Bar Association Delegates Discuss Major Important Questions, 13 ABA
J. 668, 674 (1927).
276. Maxwell, supra note 96, at 362.
277. MURRAY TEIGH BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS 157-91 (1968).
278. TISHER & BERNABEI, supra note 271, at 90-94.
279. Id. at 129.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Spann, supra note 215, at 3.
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ary process, Bringing the Bar to Justice noted, "When a lawyer's right to practice
his or her profession is at stake, due process is of course essential."283 This may
have been of particular interest to Green. Green served as the editor-in-chief of
the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review in 1970 when it published
a Comment which attacked the bar's efforts to sanction and disbar radical law-
yers.2 84 This was in stark contrast to Maxwell's 1957 speech, in which he argued
for a "greater willingness" of courts to "give proper weight to the public interest
in disciplinary proceedings as opposed to the interest of the individual lawyer ac-
cused of misconduct."2 85
The Supreme Court's due process revolution of the 1960s and early 1970s
focused on protecting the rights of the individual. Those individuals included
lawyers subject o a state's disciplinary system. The Supreme Court's decisions
required the Kutak Commission to write its standards with particularity if they
were to have any legal effect. The Kutak Commission made an early decision
that it would fix the vagueness of the 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility
by proposing rules, and only rules. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
were to be written so the lawyer knew when his or her conduct fell below that
required of all lawyers. The Model Rules were not designed to "assist lawyers
by stimulating their imagination as to sound professional behavior."286 They
were intended to serve as the basis for discipline, "'so that everything not forbid-
den by the canons is permitted.' "287
The Kutak Commission emphasized that the clarification and implementa-
tion of legal ethics rules protected society as well as clients and the courts. Its
goal was to reinforce the commitment of lawyers to standards encompassing
the public's interests. Its proposals concerning the limits of client confidences,
the duty to consider others when negotiating, and duties of candor to the court,
were all efforts to require the lawyer to consider interests beyond those of the cli-
ent. And each proposal received extraordinary pushback, and each was more nar-
rowly framed to benefit clients as the drafting process continued.
By mid-1982, the Kutak Commission had largely capitulated to the "basic
posture" of "my client, first, last and always." But that was not enough. A major-
ity of a fractured House of Delegates, at both the August 1982 and January 1983
ABA meetings, rejected more forcefully the concept of social trustee profession-
alism. Professionalism was instead better understood as serving the client at the
highest level of skill the lawyer could achieve. The client's interests overbore all
others.
283. TISHER & BERNABEI, supra note 271, at 100.
284. See Beil, supra note 194.
285. Maxwell, supra note 96, at 372.
286. Report, supra note 259, at 394; Proposed Supplements, supra note 259, at 275.
287. Report, supra note 259, at 391; Proposed Supplements, at 274 (quoting Walter Taylor, a
member of the Committee who died before the 1927 Report was completed).
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The profession's negative reaction to the proposals of the Kutak Commis-
sion made it clear that social trustee professionalism no longer commanded
even the formal or symbolic deference of a large number of lawyers. Part of
the value of social trustee professionalism was its emphasis on duty. Among
large firm lawyers this had a value in shaping the extent to which they acted
in a detached, disinterested manner toward their powerful clientele. One past
use of social trustee professionalism was to remind that small subset of lawyers
for the powerful that their actions were subject to constraints. For both instrumen-
tal and ideological reasons, social trustee professionalism was focused on the
large firm lawyer. Talks about the lawyer's duty to public service at ABA meet-
ings, largely comprised until the 1960s of a bar elite, were reminders from one to
others of the same class of the bounds of unseemly behavior and profit.
When Roscoe Pound defined a profession, he considered "incidental" the
ability of a lawyer to earn a living practicing law. For the vast majority of Amer-
ican lawyers in American history, this had never been the case. Pound surely
knew this. The lawyer's "spirit of public service" was always in tension with
the mundane, prosaic work of earning a living. As the ABA began its member-
ship drive in the late 1950s, that tension was more pronounced. The turn by
the ABA to the economics of law practice at the same time made sense once a
significant number of sole practitioners joined. The ABA attempted to marry in-
come to public service by highlighting a public interest in increasing the receipts
of the ordinary private practice lawyer.
The ABA's emphasis on public mindedness required such lawyers to define
themselves in that light. For nearly all of the time from 1955-1972, economic
growth made it easy to do good and do well. That this public-mindedness was
pronounced by well-connected, large firm lawyers at the top of the ABA was
of little concern to most lawyers.
When economic reverses for the ordinary lawyer began in the early 1970s,
doing good and doing well were in significant tension. This tension was not re-
lieved by slogans, appeals to the greater good, or even rules of ethics. As had al-
ways been the case, the profession's resort was to the lawyer's conscience. And
in an increasingly rights-filled, individualistic age (the 1970s were called the "Me
Decade" for a reason), only the lawyer chose the balance between leavening
one's commercial interests with one's professional duties.
One of the Kutak Commission's proposals in its 1979 "working draft,"
Rule 1.8, was titled "Representation of an unpopular or indigent client." Proposed
Rule 1.8 gave a lawyer substantial discretion i  choosing which clients to repre-
sent. However, the commentary admonished lawyers that "important qualifica-
tions [exist] on a lawyer's freedom in selecting clients."28 8 This was the height
of social trustee professionalism. Six months later, the Kutak Commission re-
288. See The Record: Text of Initial Draft of Ethics Code Rewrite Committee ("The Rec-
ord"), LEGAL TIMEs, Aug. 27, 1979, at 26, 31.
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turned with its Discussion Draft. Unpopular and indigent clients were no longer
title subjects. Instead, Discussion Draft Rule 1.15 was titled Accepting or Declin-
ing Representation.2 89 The Comment returned to the lawyer's "obligation to as-
sist in providing pro bono public service," but it placed greater emphasis on the
lawyer's "qualified freedom of association" not "to assist a client whose character
or cause the lawyer regards as repugnant."290 In the Proposed Final Draft of May
1981, this Rule was largely eliminated. Rule 1.16, Declining or Terminating Rep-
resentation (which was titled Terminating Representation in the Discussion
Draft) absorbed the earlier provision urging the lawyer to represent he unpopular
client, though it largely focused on when a lawyer could end a relationship with a
client.291 Rule 1.2, Scope of Representation, re-framed Discussion Draft Rule 1.3,
Client Autonomy. The Proposed Final Draft added, in section (b) to Rule 1.2, a
provision that a lawyer's representation of a client was not an endorsement of
the client's views. A comment under the section, Independence From Client's
Views or Activities, briefly reiterated the point that those "whose cause is contro-
versial or the subject of popular disapproval" "should not be denied" legal repre-
sentation.292 That was it. The Kutak Commission would not generate any ethical
duty to represent the unpopular cause or client in the interests of society.
IV. Conclusion
The identity of the legal profession turned by the time the ABA adopted the
Model Rules in 1983. One definition of "profess" is to declare one's faith or al-
legiance. Though often honored in the breach, lawyers had professed their alle-
giance to their duty to society for well over a century. And during the profes-
sional crisis of the early 20th century that alleged a devolution of the practice
of law to a business, lawyers resolved that crisis by reaffirming that lawyers
owed a duty to serve the public, a duty from which businessmen were free.
The difference between this earlier professionalism crisis and the one diagnosed
by Peter Megargee Brown and others was that lawyers no longer professed their
allegiance to social trustee professionalism. They collapsed their duty to society
with a duty of loyalty to their clients. If the duty of loyalty to clients was the high-
est duty encumbering lawyers, then lawyers fulfilled that duty by the exercise of
technocratic expertise. The absence of any tension found by the existence of a
competing duty made the work of conscience superfluous.
Whitney North Seymour titled his 1961 ABA Presidential Address The
Unity of the Bar.2 93 Seymour spoke when ABA membership was increasing rap-
idly, and his appeal to unity was designed to bring to this body the largely aris-
289. Discussion Draft, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L COND. R. 1.15 (1980).
290. Id.
291. Proposed Final Draft, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L COND. R. 1.16 (1981).
292. Id. at 12.
293. Whitney North Seymour, The Unity of the Bar, 86 A.B.A. REP. 443 (1961).
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tocratic responsibility of lawyers to acknowledge a duty to "help[] the poor, de-
fend[] the unpopular and provide[] community leadership."294 Seymour framed
this duty in a historical light, as well as in an organizational context. Seymour
was acutely aware of the frailties and faults of the profession dating from the Sec-
ond Red Scare and continuing during the civil rights movement. In spite of these
professional failures, Seymour spoke optimistically. All lawyers, not just elite
lawyers, had played, and would continue to play, a central and crucial role in
the development of modern America.295 Symbolically, Seymour's assertion of-
fered to all lawyers a strong and positive sense of duty. This profession of alle-
giance to the ideal of the lawyer as social trustee brought a unifying role to a
large, diverse body. And professionally, Seymour's career demonstrated the so-
cial good lawyers could do.
Seymour's appeal was the traditional claim to each lawyer's conscience. It
has ever been thus. The unintended failure of the Model Rules was its effort to
assume legal standards could replace the individual lawyer's conscience. Legal
standards are the last resort in channeling behavior, including lawyer behavior.
In Texas, for example, a variation of the Model Rules was adopted as law in
1990. By 1993-1994, 655 lawyers (of 59,495 licensed lawyers) were disciplined,
or 1.1 percent.296 That was the high water mark. By 2014-2015, a mere .3 percent
of Texas lawyers were disciplined (318/96,912).297
We should not be surprised that the language of discipline fails to shock law-
yers into becoming their better angels. The positive approach of civility codes
does no better, and appears to be a contradiction in terms. But memory may
have a value in occasionally pricking the lawyer's conscience. At the second
Presidential Showcase on the lawyer's independence in 1984, Roger Cramton
noted, "The lawyer's professional independence is a memory founded on ideal-
ism and public service."2 98 That ideal "is and has been an occasional reality."299
That occasional reality is all lawyers and the public can and should expect.
We are not angels, and despite our best efforts, our flaws and failures are usually
on display. Most of us will fail when we attempt to move self-interest to our sec-
ond highest priority. But failure means we tried.
294. Id. at 444.
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